Lizzie Brady
Immigration Law & Procedure
Fall 2002

Immigrant Categories

The Fundamentals: Quotas and Preferences
In General
•	Subjective intent: Presumption of immigration; burden on alien to show that she won’t stay
•	No judicial review of consular decisions, e.g., denial of visa
•	Two aspects to immigration visa
o	Quantitative: Quotas –  INA § 202
o	Qualitative: Reasons why person can be denied – INA § 212
•	Waivers available if certain relatives in U.S. and hardship demonstrated to those relatives; high burden
•	Essential terms: 
o	Petitioner: U.S. citizen
o	Beneficiary: Individual seeking resident status or visa
o	Chargeability: Country of birth
o	Derivative status: derivative is a dependent of beneficiary
•	Immediate relatives do not have derivatives
Quantitative
•	Non-quota: immediate relative (parent, spouse, child)
•	Quota: limit as per Visa Bulletin
o	Worldwide cap
o	Per-country cap
o	Preference category within these caps

Immigrants Exempt from the General Quotas
•	Immediate relatives
o	Spouses, parents and children of USC, except citizen son or daughter must be at least 21. INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i)
o	“Child” = unmarried and under 21.  INA § 101(b)(1)
•	LPRs returning from temporary visits abroad.  INA § 101(a)(27)(A), 201(b)(1)(A)
o	Either exempt at time of original admission or already counted once before
•	Certain former US citizens.  INA § 101(a)(27)(B)
•	Children born to LPRs temporarily abroad.  INA § 201(b)(2)(B)
•	Persons who receive certain permanent forms of discretionary relief from removal.  INA § 201(b)(2)(B)
•	People fleeing persecution.  INA § 201(b)(1)(B)
•	Parolees as per discretion of AG.  INA § 212(d)(5)
o	Grant of parole is not considered an admission
•	Special groups ad hoc on a nonquota basis, as determined by Congress.  INA § 201(b)(1)(C)
o	Issuance of limited number of additional immigrant visas on a one-shot basis to nationals of underrepresented countries
o	Congress has also occasionally awarded LPR status on a nonquota basis to groups of people who arrive from selected countries as part of an unusual migration; one-time-only statutes
o	Temporary legislation enacted to allow certain nurses already working in US on nonimmigrant visas to adjust to LPR without regard to usual numerical caps

Immigrants Subject to the General Quotas
•	Programs and Ceilings
1.	Family-sponsored immigrants
•	Generally immigrants who have certain family members in the US
•	Qualifying categories listed in INA § 203(a)
•	Formula: 480,000 minus # of immediate relatives admitted in preceding year, plus any employment-based visas available but not used preceding year.  Ceiling must always be at least 226,000 (so this is really the floor).  INA § 201(c) 
•	Formula result of Immigration Act of 1990
•	Number of immediate relatives is deducted for the supply available during next fiscal year to other family members of US citizens and LPRs

2.	Employment-based immigrants
•	Certain occupational skills, certain investors, and misc others.  INA § 203(b)
•	Annual worldwide limit on employment-based immigrants is 140,000 plus any family-sponsored visas that were available by not used in the preceding year

3.	Diversity immigrants
•	Admitted because they hail from countries or regions from which the US has received relatively little immigration in recent years.  INA § 203(c).
•	Basic annual ceiling is 55,000.  INA § 201(e).  This figure now reduced to offset some of Guatemalan and Salvadoran admissions authorized by special legislation in 1997
o	Programs subject to these worldwide ceilings as well as per-country limits
•	An immigrant is “charged” to the country or colony in which she was born.  INA § 202(b).  
•	Combined numbers of family and employment immigrants from a single country may not exceed 7% of the combined worldwide limits for family and employment immigrants
•	Exemptions from per-country limitations
•	Immediate relatives and others who are exempt from worldwide limits
•	2As 
•	Employment-based immigrants during any calendar quarter in which total worldwide ceiling for employment exceeds the worldwide number of qualified applicants.  INA § 202(a)(5)(A).  Thus, since almost always the case, per-country limits are unlikely to affect employment-based immigrants

•	Preference Categories and Ceilings
o	Family-sponsored program: four preference categories.  INA § 203(a)
•	Second preference split into two sub-groups
•	2As: spouses and “children” of LPRs
o	2A floor: 77% of worldwide second preference visas
o	75% of 2A floor exempt from per-country limits.  INA §202(a)(4)
•	2Bs: over-age-21 unmarried sons and daughters of LPRs

1st 	Unmarried sons and daughters of USC	23,400 plus any visas unused from 4th 	
2nd 	Spouses and children of LPRs (2A) and 
unmarried sons and daughters of LPRs (2B)	114,200 plus any visas unused by 1st plus amount (if any) by which the total worldwide family ceiling exceeds 226,000	
3rd 	Married sons and daughters of USC	23,400 plus any visas unused by 1st and 2nd 	
4th 	Siblings of over-age-21 USC	65,000 plus any visas unused by 1st, 2nd, and 3rd 	

o	Employment-based program: five preference categories.  INA § 203(b)

1st 	Priority workers: immigrants with “extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business, or athletics;” “outstanding professors and researchers;” and certain “multinational execs and mgrs.”	28.6% of all employment-based plus any unused by 4th and 5th 	
2nd 	“Members of the professions holding advanced degrees” (usually grad degrees) and “aliens of exceptional ability”	28.6% of all employment-based visas plus any unused by 1st 	
3rd 	“Skilled workers, professionals” (without advanced degrees) and other workers who can show labor is needed in the US	28.6% of all employment-based visas plus any unused by 1st and 2nd.  Of these, no more that 10,000 (minus an offset for some of Guat and Salv) may go to “other workers”	
4th 	“Special immigrants” who are not exempt from quota: certain religious workers and certain long-term foreign ees of US gov’t	7.1% of employment-based visas.  No adding visas unused by other preference categories	
5th 	“Employment creation.”  Entrepreneurs who invest at least $1M each in enterprises that employ at least ten USC.  Subject to certain future conditions	Up to 7.1% of employment-based visas.  No adding visas unused by other preference categories.	

o	Spouse or child “accompanying, or following to join” an immigrant who is within any of the three broad preference categories (family, employment, diversity) is entitled to the same preference status and to the same place in line as the principal immigrant.  INA § 203(d)
•	Spouse or child must be acquired before the principal immigrant’s admission as LPR 
•	Regulations treat child as having satisfied this condition if child is product of marriage that took place before principal’s admission as LPR
•	Spouse or child regarded as “accompanying” the principal until six months after the issuance or the principal immigrant’s visa (or adjustment of status)
•	No analogous time limit on a spouse or child “following to join”
•	No comparable provision for spouse or child accompanying or following to join an immediate rel

•	Selecting Individual Applicants
o	When demand for visas for particular preference category exceeds the statutory ceiling, the applicants who applied first get the available visas
o	Clock starts when applicant files the first relevant document
•	Priority date = filing date/date received
•	Immigrants advance until priority dates become “current” as per Visa Bulletin
•	Complication of the per-country limit
o	Proration in very year in which the per-country limit is reached.  INA § 202(e)
•	If in a particular year the world wide family ceiling is twice as great as worldwide employment ceiling, then within a particular oversubscribed country family-sponsored applicants will receive twice as many visas as employment-based applicants
•	Within the family program, the visas for an oversubscribed country are allocated among the four preference categories in same proportion that apply worldwide for that year
o	When proration is used, adjustment are made to account for the fact that most of the 2As are exempt from per-country limitations
•	Problem of aging out: Bill signed 4th week of August 2002 to preserve priority date for those who “age-out” –turn 21 wile waiting.  SEE HANDOUT. 
•	Very complicated law; uncertain how it will be interpreted
•	Exam tip: identify question of aging out 
•	If petitioner dies, loose priority date and the petition dies: automatic revocation
•	Marriage can be automatic revocation

Family-Based Immigration
The Basics
•	US immigration law has long promoted family unity
•	Permanent provisions of INA aid reunification of temporarily divided family
o	201(b)(2): exempts form quotas immediate relatives and children born to LPRs temporarily abroad
o	203(a): special preferences on certain immigrants with slightly less compelling family relationships to USC or LPRs
o	203(d): preference to spouses and children accompanying or following to join most (but not all) classes of immigrants
•	Visa Office Bulletin shows long delays, which creates hardship of lengthy separation and aging-out
•	Congress’ liberalization of the 2A category for unmarried sons ad daughters of LPRs was one important response to hardship problem
•	Legal Immigration Family Equity Act (LIFE) enacted in 2000 created V-Visas
o	Beneficiaries of 2A visa petitions that were filed on or before December 21, 2000 may enter the US as nonimmigrants once waiting times exceed three years
•	At such time, may also work.  INA § 214(o)(1)(A).
o	If permanent application ultimately denied, V-status terminates 30 days later
o	Otherwise, V-status continues until LPR status is attained

Spouses
•	Same-Sex Marriages
o	Adams v. Howerton (9th Cir. 1982) p. 151
Facts: Adams, USC, and Sullivan, alien, obtained marriage license from county clerk in Colorado; Adams then petitions INS for Sullivan as immediate relative of a USC, based on Sullivan’s status as Adams’ spouse.  Petition denied, and denial aff’d by BIA; then filed action in district court challenging BIA decision on statutory and constitutional grounds.  Dist Ct. granted summary judgment to INS because homosexual marriage did not qualify Sullivan as Adams’ spouse pursuant to § 201(b). Aff’d.
Holding: Homosexual marriage does not give immediate relative status.  
Two-step analysis to determine whether marriage will be recognized for immigration purposes:
1.	Whether marriage is valid under state law
2.	Whether that state-approved marriage qualifies under the INA
•	Construction of section 201(b)
•	Congress did not intend mere validity of marriage under state law to be controlling
•	Nothing in INA suggests that reference to spouse includes a person of same sex
•	Since Congress has not indicated an intent to enlarge the ordinary meaning of “spouse” it is inappropriate for INS to expand the meaning
•	Court finds that amendments to 1965 Act expressing intent to exclude homosexuals
o	NOTE: Homosexuality had been a ground for exclusion under 1952 INA.  In 1990, Congress repealed bar on homosexual noncitizens, amending § 212(a)
o	Baehr v. Lewin (Haw. 1993).  Hawaii Supreme Court held that state statute barring same-sex marriage violated EP clause of state constitution, unless marriage bar was necessary to compelling state interest.  But 1998 state vote passed constitutional amendment prohibiting same-sex marriages.  By 1999, 29 states had expressly banned same-sex marriages.
o	Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) enacted in 1996.  Two provisions: (1) states need not give effect to acts, records, or judicial proceedings of other states allowing same-sex marriages (Query: is this compatible with Art. IV full faith and credit clause?); (2) “marriage” means only a legal union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.”

•	Fraudulent Marriages
o	Marriage must be both legally valid and factually genuine
o	Standard for determining factually genuine marriage: Whether, at the inception of the marriage, the parties intended to establish a life together
o	Two types of sham marriages
1.	Bilateral arrangements
•	Both “spouses” marry solely to facilitate immigration
•	Intending immigrant spouse (beneficiary) typically pays the USC or LPR spouse (petitioner) to enter into the marriage
2.	Unilateral arrangements
•	Beneficiary spouse deceives petitioner as to beneficiary’s feelings and intentions
o	Until 1986, INS conducted pre-approval interviews and examination of pertinent documents to detect sham marriage 
•	Prior or current marriage fraud can be ground for inadmissibility (INA § 212(a)(6)(C)) or ground for deportability (INA § 237(a)(1)(A,G)).  IMFA makes it a criminal offense.  
o	Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986 aimed at reducing marriage fraud and other goals.  This was passed based on INS Commissioner’s testimony that 30% of all petitions for immigrant visas involve suspect marital relationships.  This figure later found suspect because: low-risk cases excluded from study; high-risk cases reviewed in-depth; investigators based conclusion on “suspicion” of fraud, not actual fraud.  Statistically invalid.
•	Section 2(a)  INA § 216: Conditional permanent residence
•	Whenever a noncitizen receives LPR status as an immediate relative, as family-sponsored second preference, or as fiancé of USC, by virtue of a marriage that is less than two years old, resulting permanent residence is subject to conditions subsequent
o	This does not apply to accompanying or following spouses under INA § 203(d)
•	Conditions subsequent: 
o	If, during first 2 years of permanent residence, it is discovered that marriage was fraudulent or had been annulled or terminated or that a fee was given for the filing of the petition, then AG must terminate permanent resident status. 
o	Affirmative duty to jointly petition the INS for removal of the condition and to appear at an INS interview re: petition.  
•	Petition must be filed during 90 day period immediately preceding the 2nd anniversary of person’s admission for permanent residence
•	If not filed timely, or if without good cause either spouse fails to appear at interview, permanent residence is terminated
•	Immigrant unable to meet requirements for removing conditions subsequent may as AF to waive such requirements
o	Extreme hardship: INS has suggested that the person suffering extreme hardship could be condition resident or his/her spouse or dependent child
•	Difficult standard to meet
o	Pre-1990, only other waiver provision: conditional resident must show (1) entered into marriage in good faith; (2) terminated marriage for good cause; (3) was not at fault in failing to meet the usual requirements.
o	Section 701 of Immigration Act of 1990 liberalized grounds for waivers
•	Deleted requirement that termination of marriage be “by the alien spouse for good cause.”  
•	Added waiver for battered spouses and spouses subjected to “extreme cruelty”
•	IMFA also extends to anyone who acquires permanent resident status by virtue of being the son or daughter of an individual through a qualifying marriage
•	Related provision: INA § 204(a)(2) places certain restrictions on the person who obtains LPR status by marrying a USC or another LPR and then, after termination of that marriage, marries another noncitizen and seeks family-sponsored 2nd preference for that noncitizen
•	Section 5  INA § 204(g): PRESUMPTIVELY FRAUDULENT 11th Hour MarriageS
•	Visa petition may not be approved to grant immediate relative status or preference status by reason of marriage which was entered into during removal proceedings until alien has resided outside the US for a 2 year period beginning after the date of the marriage
•	Presumption that noncitizens who marry either USC or LPRs during exclusion or removal proceedings are especially likely to have married for immigration purposes
o	Congressional assumption that these “11th hour” marriages were fraudulent
o	Commentators attack IMFA § 5 as unduly harsh, rigid and irrational
o	Lawsuits have challenged the constitutionality of the provision
•	Equal protection (distinctions irrational), deprivation of fundamental right to marry, PDP (no opportunity to demonstrate genuineness of marriage), and irrebuttable presumption (conclusively presumes marriage formed while removal proceedings pending is sham).
Manwani v. INS (W.D.N.C. 1990) p. 173-175
Holding: IMFA § 5 irrational in actual operation and struck it down on both due process and equal protection grounds.  BUT, most courts have upheld constitutionality of IMFA § 5 

•	Compromise reached: affected noncitizens can avoid the two-year foreign residence requirement by proving the genuineness of their marriages by “clear and convincing evidence.”  INA § 204(g) 

Other Family Members
•	Preferential treatment to several family members other than spouses
•	Some ways certain family members of citizens or LPRs are made eligible for special treatment in context of removal and naturalization

•	Immediate relative: includes parents and children of USC.  INA § 201(b)(2)(A)(i)
•	Child accompanying or following to join a preference immigrant receives preference.  INA § 203(d)
•	Definition of child.  INA § 101(b)(1): Unmarried and under 21
o	Restrictions on children born out of wedlock, stepchildren, and adopted children
o	Matter of Mourillon, (BIA 1981) pg. 178
Facts:  Petitioner USC.  His mother and father never married, and his mother left him with his father.  The two moved on to West Indies and his father married; they all lived together for 12 years.  In 1953, beneficiary was born to father and stepmother.  1954, petitioner went to US but the two maintained family ties and the beneficiary came to US as nonimmigrant student and resided with petitioner at the time the petition was filed.  District Director denied petition to classify beneficiary as a sister of a US citizen under INA § 203(a)(5).  On appeal, petitioner argues that he was legitimated by his father under Curacao law and that he and beneficiary are siblings by virtue of their relationship through their stepmother/mother (common parent).  
Holding:  The BIA holds that “in order to qualify as stepsiblings either (1) the marriage which created the step-relationship must continue to exist, or (2) where the parties to that marriage have legally separated or the marriage has been terminated by death or divorce, a family relationship must continue to exist as a matter of fact between the ‘stepsiblings.’”  Since the record reflects that petitioner and beneficiary continue to maintain their family relationship, BIA sustains appeal.  
Rationale:  Dis Dir correctly noted that petitioner must show that he and beneficiary are or once were children of a common parent within the meaning of INA §101(b)(1&2) to establish a sibling relationship.  Dis Dir found that petitioner was illegitimate and had not been legitimized by his father so he denied the petition.  Under §2 of Civil Code of Curacao, legitimation of child born out of wedlock only occurs when natural parents marry and acknowledge the child.  An acknowledgement does not confer the same rights as legitimation does – they are not equivalent, thus an acknowledgement is not the same as an ack with marriage of natural parents.  The petitioner was not legitimated.  The two can show a valid relationship under the stepmother/mother common parentage if petitioner was under 18 when the marriage occurred.  Petitioner was 13, and beneficiary was born after, so they qualify as siblings as children of a common parent. 

o	1986 amendment to INA § 101(b)(1)(D): Petitions allowed “if the father has a bona fide parent-child relationship with the person.”
o	Palmer v. Reddy (9th Cir. 1980) pg. 182
Holding: as long as the marriage had taken place before the child turned 18, and the marriage was still intact, a step-relationship would be found even if there was no parent-child relationship in fact.  

Employment-Based Immigration
	
Preferences: “Superstars, Stars and Others”—General Eligibility Requirements
•	First Preference
o	Extraordinary ability in the sciences, arts, education, business or athletics which has been demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim
o	Outstanding professors and researchers
o	International executives and managers
o	Not tied to certain employer; skip labor certification process

•	Second Preference
o	Members of the professions holding advanced degrees or their equivalent
o	Exceptional ability in the sciences, arts or business
o	Generally requires that the applicant demonstrate a job offer from a US employer and obtain labor certification from DOL. 
o	INS has discretion to waive job offer requirement in the national interest
•	Matter of New York State Dept. of Transportation (I & N 1999) [NYSDOT]
Holding: An applicant for a national interest waiver must show (1) area of employment is one “of substantial intrinsic merit;” (2) person’s employment will benefit the nation, not just the local area; (3) particular applicant “will serve the national interest to a substantially greater degree than would an available US worker having the same minimum qualifications.”
•	Example: While education in the national interest, impact of a single schoolteacher in one elementary school would not be in the national interest for waiver purposes

•	Third Preference
o	Immigrants capable of performing certain “skilled labor” for which qualified US workers are not avail
•	Usually at least 2 years
o	Immigrants who have baccalaureate degrees and are members of the professions
o	“Other workers” capable of performing unskilled labor for which qualified US workers are not avail
•	Presumption that US workers can do this job
o	Labor certification required
o	No provision of national interest waivers
o	No more than 10,000 visas may be issued to “other workers” prong of this category

•	Fourth Preference
o	Religious workers

•	Fifth Preference
o	Employment creation: 10 jobs and $1M
o	Highly controversial; undermined somewhat because this person could probably  fall into 1st preference as an international executive/manager

Labor Certification
•	Steps required for Second and Third preference categories.  INA § 212(a)(5(D)
1.	Need someone ready, willing, and able to work.  
2.	One of the first steps is to check 2 “schedules” published by DOL.  Schedule A lists occupations that DOL has “pre-certified” as meeting the substantive stat requirements for labor cert.  
a.	Schedule A:  If an alien’s occupation is listed in Schedule A, labor cert deemed to have been automatically granted, allowing the employer to bypass the DOL and file the visa petition with the INS for determination of whether or not the alien’s job really falls within one of the Schedule A occupations.  
b.	Schedule B:  Occupations which ordinarily will NOT meet the statutory criteria for labor certification because there are plenty of US workers to fill them: parking lot attendant, service station attendants, bartenders, cashiers, taxicab drivers, typists…  When the alien’s occupation is on that list, applicant for labor cert must apply for a waiver and make showings beyond those usually required.  
3.	Application submitted to the local office of the state employment service which makes various findings, and eventually it winds up at the DOL where it is adjudicated by official known as “certifying officer” (CO).  
4.	To receive approval, employer must document its unsuccessful attempts to recruit American workers at prevailing wages.  Employees or their bargaining rep are to be contacted to allow opportunity to submit documentary evidence bearing on the application.  If CO finds that applicant meets all requirements, labor cert granted.  Otherwise, CO issues a “Notice of Findings” explaining the problem and giving applicant 35 days in which to submit written arg or evidence to cure the defect.  If no response or if the rebuttal submission does not change the CO’s mind, labor cert denied.  There are provisions for internal admin review of CO decision to deny labor cert: appeals to Board of Alien Labor Certification Appeals, which sits in 3 judge panels in DC.  These decisions are subject to judicial review in fed court.  
5.	When filing for labor certification, the employer must be paying and offering the prevailing wage (to ensure that there are really no available US workers for the job).  Requirements listed on job description must be tied to actual, reasonable job expectations.  
6.	Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT) tells us what normal and fair job description is.  Cannot exceed SVP* because that is what is considered fair and normal for that job.  If employer can show that employee must have BA, MA, and 1 year experience to be able to deal with the advanced technology, can exceed SVP and it may be ok if can show business necessity.  If can’t show business necessity, requirements are considered unduly restrictive.  
•	SVP= specific vocational preparation

7.	Advertising: (1) newspaper or journal; (2) posting at office; (3) state job bank for 30 days.  
8.	Followed by 45 day recruitment period.  Employer limited to rqmts on certification; can disqualify applicants not authorized to work; must certify why/why not hired for each applicant

•	INA § 212(a)(14): Alien seeking to enter the US for the purpose of performing skilled or unskilled labor is ineligible to receive visa unless Sec. of Labor has determined and certified to the Secretary of State and AG that: 
(1) Not sufficient workers in the US who are able, willing, qualified and available at the time of application for a visa and admission into the US and at the place where the alien is to performs such labor; 
(2) The employment of the alien will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions of US workers similarly employed.

•	Displacing American Workers
o	Matter of Marion Graham (Board of Alien Labor Cert. Appeals 1990) pg 195
Facts: Graham filed application for labor certification for alien houseworker/child-monitor (live-in); denied by CO because job opportunity described with unduly restrictive requirements.  Live-in was unduly restrictive; but, if Graham could provide documentation that live-in requirement was a business necessity.  Graham failed to document live-in requirement as business necessity.  Graham appealed.
Holding: In affirming the COs denial of labor certification, the Board held that documentation was insufficient to show business necessity for live-in requirement.  
•	Business necessity test in live-in domestic context: 20 CFR § 656.21(b)(2)(ii)
•	Pertinent factors include employer’s occupation or commercial activities outside the home, circumstances of household itself and other extenuating circumstances, which must be weighed on a case-by-case basis
•	Written assertions made by employer do not constitute documentation: neither reasonably specific nor adequately indicate their sources or bases.

o	Matter of Tel-Ko Electronics (Board of Alien Labor Cert. Appeals 1990) pg 199
Facts: Employer filed labor certification application for alien, listing job requirements as BS in electronic engineering, 2 years experience in job offered and knowledge of Korean language.  CO denied because foreign language rqment unduly restrictive and not shown out of business necessity.  Employer appealed.
Holding: Board sustained appeal because documentation convincingly establishes that knowledge of Korean is essential to perform, in a reasonable manner, job duties described by employer.  
•	Information Industries business necessity test
•	Job requirements bear a reasonable relationship to the occupation in the context of the employer’s business
•	Requirements are essential to perform, in a reasonable manner, the job duties as described by employer
•	As applied to foreign language requirement, must show (1) that a significant portion of its business is performed in foreign language or with foreign-speaking clients or employees and (2) that employee’s duties require communication or reading in a foreign language.
•	Here, over 95% of suppliers and employees are Korean and speak no English, and over 95% of its business is dependant on use of Korean. 

o	Non-English speaking workforce is a separate issue; usually not justification for language rqmt

o	Infeasibility test: If employer proposes to combine two functions in a single job, board held that employer must demonstrate tow separate employees would not be inefficient or costly, but so impractical as to be infeasible.  

o	INA § 212(a)(5)(A) requires applicant for labor certification to demonstrate that no “able, willing, qualified” workers are available.  With only two exceptions (teachers and those with exceptional ability in the sciences or the arts, it is not enough for the employer to show that no equally qualified workers are available.  Thus, employer must ordinarily hire a minimally qualified US worker over more qualified noncitizen.

o	Job Requirements will be considered Presumptively Unduly Restrictive where:
The job requirements which employer requires of US workers are 
(1)	other than those normally required for the job in US; 
(2)	exceed the requirements listed in the Dictionary of Occupational Titles; 
(3)	include a foreign language; 
(4)	involve a combination of duties or 
(5)	require the worker to live on the employer’s premises.
Employer must use documentation to demonstrate that its requirements arise from business necessity.  

•	Adversely Affecting the Wages and Working Conditions of American Workers
o	Industrial Holographics, Inc. v. Donovan (7th Cir. 1983) pg. 212
Facts: Employer applied for labor cert for an export mgr after having posted job internally, advertising in the newspapers and with the state employment service.  The employer listed the wage as $1000 per month when in fact it was $1,666.00, which under regs employer was required to list.  In light of this, CO issued notice of findings to the employer proposing to deny the cert.  After receipt of the notice, employer agreed to repeat the process and list $1666 as the wage.  The employer did list wage at the corrected rate but did not provide documentation that it posted the job for internal recruitment, did not document result of recruitment efforts, and did not recruit for 30 days through the state employment service.  ALJ reviewed decision of certifying officer and affirmed it.  
Holding: Affirmed denial of labor certification.  Petitioners argue that Sec of Labor exceeded authority by requiring employer to advertise position at “prevailing wage,” but the regs do require that Sec certify aliens only when his or her employment “will not adversely affect the wages and working conditions” or similarly employed US workers.  This court takes that to mean that regs assume that the employment of an alien at wages below the prevailing wage will tend to adversely affect the wages and working conditions of Americans.  

o	What is prevailing wage, etc.?
•	The “prevailing wage” is generally considered to be the average wage of workers “similarly employed in the area of intended employment” (with a 5% leeway).  
•	Area refers to geography: “area within normal commuting distance of the place [address] of intended employment.”  
•	Similarly employed is defined by the regs to mean “having substantially comparable jobs in the occupational category in the area of intended employment.”  
•	If no such jobs in the local area, similarly employed means “having jobs requiring a substantially similar level of skills” within the local area or outside the local area if necessary. 

o	Prevailing Wage Exception for Colleges and Universities
•	The Labor Dept reacted to a concern in the higher education community after the Board’s conclusion that “similarly employed” refers only to job requirements not the nature of the employer [colleges and universities feared that they would have to pay the same wages to researchers than those paid in industry which were signif higher] by publishing a proposed rule that would allow colleges and universities to pay researchers the wages prevailing at other colleges and universities in the area of intended employment.  

•	Two ways of doing Labor Certification
o	Traditional Route
•	submit application for X (one for employer, one for employee); Board gives employer the go ahead to advertise (newspaper 3 consecutive days, journal for one, state job bank and post it at place of employment), and resumes actually go to the Board of Labor Cert; need to contact people who look qualified, if very qualified must be interviewed; need to find someone ready, willing, available, and qualified.  It is difficult when subjective criteria used by employer to make decision.  
o	Reduction in Recruitment (RIR):
•	Procedure where employer is allowed to advertise ahead of time
•	DOL can take into consideration general market conditions (e.g., layoffs)

•	E-based Visa
o	Labor certification – person has job skill in short supply in US or at that time, employer can’t find a US worker for the work.  Required for those applying under 2nd and 3rd preferences.
o	E-based visa petition – employer must show it is what it says it is and employee must show that s/he is what s/he says and has the requisite experience to perform job
o	Employee goes to US embassy (if abroad) or if in US, final application submitted for approval.  Employees who have been working for several years and have lapsed out of status may get blocked at this state.

Analyzing Employment-Based Problems: 
1.	Identify possible avenues of e-based immigration
2.	Identify any issues or problem areas in labor certification
3.	Identify possible avenues of family based immigration
4.	Look for family-based problems as well.

Diversity Immigrants
	
General: INA § 203(c)
•	Countries of high immigration cannot participate in the diversity lottery; the theory behind this is to give people with no other hope a chance to enter the US.  Must show at least equivalent of HS diploma or a skill that takes a minimum of 2 years training, if don’t, when name called will be disqualified.  

Immigration and the Constitution

Sources of Federal Immigration Power
General
•	Enumerated Powers: Commerce Clause; Migration or Importation Clause; Naturalization Clause; War Clause
Necessary & proper: sovereign nation has to be able to control its borders

•	Implied Constitutional Powers
o	Chae Chan Ping v. U.S. (S. Ct. 1889) pg. 14 CHINESE EXCLUSION CASE
Facts: Statute of 1882 suspended all future immigration of Chinese laborers but provided that those who had been living in US since 1880 were free to leave and return (issuing them certificates which evidenced their rights to return).  While Π was on his visit in 1887, Congress enacted a stat of 1888 that discontinued the certificate program and prohibited the return of those Chinese laborers who had already received certificates.  He was excluded one week after passage of the statute.  Attacked the validity of 1888 Act on two grounds: 1) violated an 1880 treaty between US and China and 2) violated Constitution.  
Holding: Court acknowledged that stat conflicted with treaty but held that stats and treaties on equal footing so due to chronology stat would prevail.  

Limits to the Federal Immigration Power
Modern Developments
•	Procedural Due Process in Exclusion Cases
o	Shaughnessy v. U.S. ex rel Mezei (S. Ct. 1953) pg. 51 – Process minimal; entrants have no const rights
Facts: unlawful detention, found deportable because “security risk,” & other country wouldn’t accept because of this – stuck on Ellis Island.
Holding: Since this guy never had LPR status and he left, he is considered an entrant.  An entrant can be denied entry without a hearing and the AG need not disclose his reasons for denying entry and can deny entry if AG deems person’s admission as adverse to US interests.  Temporary harborage does not confer additional rights so there is no change in status just because bond was posted and he was allowed in pending hearing.  There are no procedural or Constitutional violations because this guy is just an entrant and immigration laws allow the US to give them no process.  
Dissent: Really focuses on the fact that this man was held for a long time for no reason (criminal or waiting for trial) while he was waiting to get in to some country.  Actually considers the circumstances like that this guy lived in the US for 25 years and caused no trouble, only left because his mother was dying, got his visa at the consulate in Eastern Europe but was denied admission once he got to NYC.  This guy was held for 2 years as 12 countries rejected his entrance and only the AG knows why and can do something about it.  Jackson is appalled that the government takes the stance that this man has “no rights.”  

o	Harisiades v. Shaughnessy (S. Ct. 1952) pg. 71 – LPRs deportable when Congress deems them to be
Facts: 3 aliens with LPR status (2 now married to US citizens and one to another LPR, all with USC kids) used to be members of Communist Party but are no longer.  After termination of their membership, Congress passed legislation making alien members of groups that advocate the violent overthrow of government by force deportable.  In administrative proceedings, all 3 aliens found deportable, as there were express findings that Communist Party espouses that philosophy.  Πs now challenge Constitutionality of the law.  
Holding: Main contention is that by conferring LPR status the aliens got a vested right to remain within the country and taking that away requires PDP.  The second arg is that the act bears no reasonable relation to interests of the US and so it should be declared invalid by the judiciary because the power to deport on this basis is very “dispersed.”  Basically as to the first, the court says that LPRs are relieved of some burdens that citizens face and are given extra protection by their home countries because still citizens, and when our country fights the LPRs home country they become an enemy and US can expel them.  But the US does not need to declare a war to have sufficient cause to expel or exclude somebody.  Congress knows what it is doing and it thinks that Communists – past and present – pose a danger to the US like this so it is ok.  This is something we should defer to Congress about but nevertheless the court holds that the Act does not violate DP.  Court then says that the 1st Am does not reach violence or incitements of violence which is what Communist organizing does so this prohibition is not violative of the 1st.  

o	Zadvydas v. Davis (S. Ct. 2001) pg 100 – indefinite detention not ok for LPRs subject to removal
Holding: (1) INA’s post-removal-period detention provision contains implicit reasonableness limitation; (2) federal habeas stat grants federal courts authority to decide whether given post-removal-period detention is statutorily authorized; and (3) presumptive limit to reasonable duration of post-removal-detention period is 6 months. 
•	Statutory interpretation to impose the reasonable time period 
•	Majority seems to side-step the constitutional issue
•	Dissent: states that Mezei is controlling; once found deportable an alien has no rights

o	Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Committee et al. (S. Ct. 1999) pg. 85 
Facts: Resident aliens filed suit claiming they had been targeted for deportation because of their affiliation with a politically unpopular group.  While suit pending, IIRAIRA passed and that contains a provision restricting judicial review of the AG’s decision or action to commence proceedings, adjudicate cases, or execute removal orders against any alien under the Act.  After IIRAIRA was passed during pendency of suit, the D. Ct granted SJ on selective enforcement claim and preliminarily enjoined deportation proceedings as to aliens with visas.  9th Cir upheld the injunction holding that D. Ct. had juris over claims of LPRs and remanded.  D. Ct refused to dissolve existing preliminary injunction as to aliens with visas and granted injunction in favor of LPRs, government appealed.  
Holding: (1) exclusive juris clause of IIRAIRA deprived courts of juris over action, and (2) doctrine of constitutional doubt did not require interpretation of exclusive juris clause as allowing exercise of jurisdiction.  Held that §242 does apply to pending cases.  The government should be able to deport who it wants without having to explain itself – Congress didn’t want court review, there is no court review.  

Non-Immigrant Categories
Introduction
•	Allowed into the US for a fixed period of time and for specific purpose; temporary stay
•	Presumption of immigrant status: Must have non-immigrant intent.  INA § 214(b).  Must meet criteria for certain non-immigrant classes.  INA § 101(a)(15).
•	Two hurdles
o	Establishing qualification under one of the specific statutory categories
o	Avoiding various affirmative grounds of inadmissibility
•	Visa must meet intention
•	Admission procedure
o	Applying for visa abroad
o	Presenting visa to INS immigration inspector at the port of entry
•	Changing form one category to another if still “in status”
o	Only if you have maintained first status
o	Otherwise, must leave country (if you have violated status) and try to come back in; then may be subject to other grounds of inadmissibility
•	Spouses and children usually have categories
o	F-1  F-2
o	L-1  L-2	 Derivative visas
o	H-1  H 2

Commercial Categories of Nonimmigrants

Temporary Workers 
•	Specialty Occupations, Athletes and Entertainers: H-1Bs, Os and Ps
o	H1B is the principal vehicle for admission of temporary professional workers
•	Requires “specialty occupation” with “theoretical and practical application of a body of highly specialized knowledge” – at least a bachelor’s degree or the equivalent
•	Must be coming temporarily to the US and may be admitted for up to 6 years
•	Employer must file labor condition application with DOL, attesting to several things, such as (1) paying at least prevailing wage; (2) working conditions of similarly employed workers will not be adversely affected; (3) there is not a strike or lockout; and (4) that employer has notified its existing employees of the filing.
•	Wage and Hour Division (WHD) issue a determination letter if violation
•	Method for computing required wage has been difficult and controversial issue
•	DOL and others have worried that H1B petitions are being abused and that American workers are not adequately protected by the process
•	Immigration Act of 1990 limits annual admissions of H1Bs to 65,000
•	Frustration with this cap led to the passage of the American Competitiveness in the Twenty-First Century Act of 2000, increasing the caps for the years 2001, 2002, and 2003 and exempting higher ed institutions and nonprofit and governmental research institutions from the caps
•	Employers must pay fees and meet heightened requirements as H1B dependent companies
•	To diminish opportunity for employer exploitation, Congress added a “portability” provision that makes it easier for H1Bs to change jobs after the arrival.  INA § 214(m) 

o	O category covers athletes, entertainers, persons in the other arts, the sciences, education and business
•	Must have “extraordinary ability which has been demonstrated by sustained national or international acclaim.
•	Also covers certain members of principal nonimmigrants support staff and certain family members of either the principal or support staff
•	Admission may be for a period of up to three years, with possible one-year extensions

o	P category covers athletes, entertainers and artists.  No numerical cap
•	P1 category covers internationally recognized (but not necessarily “extraordinary”) athletes and members of internationally recognized entertainment groups performing in specific events.
•	Admitted for up to five years, and extended for up to five additional years so long as total does not exceed 10 years
•	P2 category includes artists and entertainers who which to enter under reciprocal exchange programs
•	Admitted for up to one year and extensions are in one-year increments
•	P3 category entertainers or artist who would provide programs that are “culturally unique” 
•	Admitted for up to one year and extensions are in one-year increments

o	From time to time, Congress enacts special legislation addressing periodic shortages of nurses

•	Lesser Skills and Labor Shortages: H-2s
o	H2 required nonimmigrants coming to (a) perform agricultural labor or services of a temporary or seasonal nature of (b) to perform other temporary service or labor if unemployed US workers cannot be found to do the work
o	Requires that person have “a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning” and that he or she be “coming temporarily to the United States”
•	H2A: employer must obtain a certification from DOL that sufficient US workers cannot be found; minimum hourly rates
•	H2B: initially admitted for up to one year; may receive one-year extensions, up to a total of 3; must first apply of labor certification; limit of 66,000 per year. 
•	Temporary labor certification is merely advisory, i.e., does not bind the INS; individual may overcome DOL’s denial of labor certification by presenting countervailing evidence

•	Trainees: H-3s
o	Must be person who “has residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning who is coming temporarily to the US as a trainee”
•	Tightly regulated

•	Miscellaneous Other Temporary Workers
o	Few other categories of occupational nonimmigrants are recognized: crew members of foreign vessel and aircraft; foreign journalists, official representative so foreign governments and international organizations
•	Q-Visas: International cultural exchange program approved by the AG for the purpose of providing practical training, employment, and sharing of the history, culture and traditions of t country of the alien’s nationality.  INA § 101(a)(15)(Q).  Limited to 15 months.  Disney provision. 
o	NAFTA professionals

Intra-company Transferees
•	L-category.  INA § 101(a)(15)(L)
o	Karmali v. INS (9th Cir. 1983) pg. 345
Facts: Born in Tanzania; began employment w/AF-CHIM in Nov. 1976 in Canada; began working in Idaho in Apr. 1977; AF-CHIM filed petition in Dec. 1977 for intra-company transfer visa on behalf of Karmali.  District Director denied petition.  Appealed up to 9th Circuit.  
Holding: Affirmed denial.  Language of statute “employed continuously for one year” interpreted to mean one year of continuous employment abroad prior to seeking admission into US as an intra-company transferee.  Since Karmali had worked in Canada for less than one year, INS did not abuse discretion.  

o	Blanket L’s: huge companies make blanket application by submitting all papers re: interests and corporate relation .  Then person must just show proof of employment.  Shortens process

H and L categories accumulate years

Educational Categories
Students
•	Major provision is INA § 101(a)(15)(F)
o	F1s: foreign students (not entering as vocation or “nonacademic” institutions); noncitizen spouses and minor children acquire F2 status
o	Admitted for “duration of status” whereby a designated school official estimates a reasonable “completion date” for the program an can add a grace period of up to one year
•	Student can apply to the University for extension, which will be granted only upon showing of “compelling academic or medical reasons, such as changes of major or research topics, unexpected research problems, or documented illnesses.”
•	University must then inform the INS of extension; for an extended F1 stay, must depart the US at the expiration of the authorized period of extension.
o	Must demonstrate sufficient funds
•	Stringent restrictions on employment; may work on campus up to 20 hours per week during year and up to 40 hours per week during vacations. 
•	Immigration Act of 1990 § 221 established supplementary pilot program which allows F1 students to work up to 20 hours per week off-campus, after their first year, without a showing of economic necessity.  Must be in good academic standing  
•	Related statutory provisions: 
o	IIRIRA § 625 added new subsection 214(m): F1 status may no longer be granted to permit a child to attend a public elementary school or t permit a student to attend a public secondary school unless the student pays the full per-capita cost of education; maximum duration 12 months
•	Any student violating this provision is deportable and inadmissible for 5 years after violation
o	IIRIRA § 641: requires AG to collect individualized information from colleges and universities on every foreign student they enroll
•	Required info includes: identity, address, dates of any changes in immigration statute, whether student Is maintaining full-time-student status, any disciplinary action taken against student due to criminal conviction.  Rights under Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act taken away.  
o	Section 416 of USA PATRIOT Act requires full implementation of § 641 and extend scope from institutions of higher ed to all approved educational institutions

Exchange Visitors
•	Exchange visitors are part of a mutual exchange program in which students, teachers, scholars, and others enter the US temporarily to pursue various education-related goals.
•	Obtain J1 status; noncitizen spouses and minor children acquire J2 status.  INA § 101(a)(15(J)
o	Much discussion about use of J1 status by summer camp counselors and au pairs.  Camp counselor must be over 18 and meet many requirements.  In 1997, Congress made au pair program permanent and more rigorous requirements: must be over 18, secondary school graduate, proficient in English, pass a background check, and must attend postsecondary education institution for at least six hours per week and is limited to 45 hours per week of child care.  Duration limited to one year. 	
•	EduCare branch added designed for households with only school-age children; au pair attends post secondary school for at least 12 hours per week and no more than 30 hours of child care
•	Both F and J cover students
o	Advantage of J1 visa over F1 visa is the slightly more liberal employment rules governing J visas
•	Maximum duration of stay depends on category
o	J students in degree programs may remain as long as they are pursuing full courses of study at institution for which they are approved and are maintaining satisfactory advancement
•	To qualify for J status, studies must be part of specific program approved in advance by State Department and applicant must be sponsored by a US gov’t agency or a recognized international agency, or one of various private agencies

Tourists
General – INA § 101(a)(15)(B)
•	Certain nonimmigrants visiting the US temporarily for business (B1) or pleasure (B2).  
•	Authorized period of initial admission ranges from six months to one year, and extensions may be granted in 6 month increments 
•	B2s absolutely prohibited from employment in the US
•	B2 cases usually not controversial, but there can be other admission problems
o	Matter of Healy and Goodchild (BIA 1979) pg. 365
Facts: Both issued B2 visa.  During inspection upon arrival in NY, each found in possession of a letter of acceptance for admission to a 9-month course of study at an institution not approved for attendance by nonimmigrant students.  Charged with excludability under § 212(a)(7)(B) as nonimmigrant students not in possession of valid nonimmigrant student visas and under § 212(a)(6)(C) as aliens who procured visas by willfully misrepresenting material facts.  Respondent’s argued that because school was not approved, could not get any other visa; F1 would not apply.
Holding: Alien bound for US for primary purpose of study is not admissible as a B2 but must instead establish entitlement to nonimmigrant student F-status.  BIA did not find fraud or intention to deceive, but BIA disagrees that since school not accredited by INS, applicants not subject to provisions of F-status.  B clearly excludes nonimmigrants coming for the purpose of study.  

Fiancés and Fiancées
General – INA § 101(a)(15)(K) and 214(d)
•	Noncitizen fiancé receives K1 status; noncitizen minor children accompanying or following to join receive K2
•	§ 214(d) requires that fiancés have met each other during the two year period preceding the piling of the petition (added by IMFA § 3(a))
•	Spouses of USC normally acquire immigrant status as immediate relatives; however, long processing delays have kept spouses separated for lengthy periods
o	In 2000, Congress enacted new INA § 101(a)(15)(K)(ii) which permits spouses of USC to enter as K-nonimmigrants (and to work) while immigrant visas are being processed.  LIFE Act § 1103(a)
•	Noncitizen spouse receive K3 visa and children accompanying or following to join receive K4
•	Moss v. INS (5th Cir. 1981) pg 369
Facts: Applicant admitted into US under K visa as nonimmigrant alien finance of USC; lived with fiancé for one year while in the Philippines and intended to marry at the time of entry into the US.  92 days after entry, they married; child born and two months later the husband left her.  INS issued a show cause order to establish deportability.  IJ interpreted § 214(d) and its 90 day requirement as rigid and found Moss deportable because she had not married within the 90 day period authorized by the K visa.  
Holding: Moss should have been allowed to show why she could not formalize marriage within the 90 day period and if she can demonstrate that the 2 day delay was due to factors beyond her control, the 90 day period must be tolled.  Purpose behind § 214 is to facilitate formation of marital relationships; the relevant inquiry is whether the parties have a bona fide intent to marry after the alien enters.  Purpose of the time limit is to qualify the intention of the alien to soon marry upon entrance into the US rather than to place absolute and mandatory period of time within which the marriage must occur.  
o	“Substantial compliance” rule

Other Nonimmigrant Categories
•	T visas for victims of severe form of trafficking in persons who are physically present in the US or a port of entry as a result of that trafficking; if 15 or over, person must comply with any reasonable request for assistance in eh investigation or prosecution of the trafficking and must demonstrate “extreme hardship involving unusual and severe harm upon removal.”  Trafficking Victims Protection Act of 2000; INA § 101(a)(15)(T)
•	T nonimmigrants may work; limit of 5000 per year, not counting family members; after three years, T-nonimmigrants may adjust to LPR status under prescribed conditions.  
•	U visas for individuals who have suffered substantial physical or mental abuse as a result of any of several enumerated acts of violence.  VAWA 2000; INA § 101(a)(15)(U). 
•	U nonimmigrants may work; annual limit is 10,000, not counting family members; after three years, U-nonimmigrants may adjust to LPR status under prescribed conditions
•	V visas for spouses of USC who are separated due to long processing delays.  LIFE Act; INA § 101(a)(15)(V).  
•	Same statute has provided analogous but much more limited relief for spouses and children of LPRs
•	Permits admission only while waiting for priority dates to become current, but only if petition was filed before Dec. 21, 2000.  
•	No numerical limits and employment is permitted

Change of Nonimmigrant Status
Two provisions
•	INA § 245: certain no immigrants can become permanent residents without leaving the US
•	INA § 248: certain nonimmigrants can switch to different nonimmigrant categories without leaving the country
•	To receive benefit of either section, the person must not only satisfy several specific conditions of eligibility but also obtain favorable discretion of the INS.  Person has to have been lawfully admitted as nonimmigrant; must be “continuing to maintain that status;” and certain categories of nonimmigrants are ineligible to change to certain other categories
•	An M1 (vocational student) cannot use § 248 to obtain F1 (academic student) status
•	No one can use § 248 to obtain K (finance) or C (transit) status
•	Noncitizens who are inadmissible for have been unlawfully present fore more than 6 months are also ineligible for change of status.  INA § 212(a)(9)(B0(i), 248

Type of visa application	Type of non-immigrant	
A	Federal government officials and families	
B1	Temporary visitors for business	
B2	Temporary visitors for pleasure	
C	Transit Aliens	
E1	Treaty Traders and families	
E2	Treaty Investors and families	
F-1	Academic Student	
M-1	Vocational students	
G	Representatives to intl orgs	
J-1	Exchange visitor – broad-range, includes students, scholars, researchers, trainees, specialists, research assistants.  	
H
H1A 
H1B (all H1Bs must get labor cert)	Temporary worker
R.N.s
Specialty Occupation	
L
L1A
L1B	Intra-company transferee
Executives and managers
Employees with specialized knowledge	
K	Fiancée	
O	Extraordinary ability in Sci, Art, Ed, Bus, Sports	
P	Athlete or performing artist	
I-1	Reps of foreign information media	

Exclusion Grounds and Waivers
Introduction
•	Inadmissibility grounds under INA § 212(a); various classes on noncitizens ineligible to receive visas and ineligible to be admitted to the US unless they qualify for waiver
•	Exclusion grounds cover wide range of subject matter:
o	Communicable diseases, criminal activity, national security, poverty, protection of the work force, functioning of the immigration system, and miscellaneous other concerns
•	Prevents noncitizens from receiving visas and rendering them inadmissible at port of entry
•	Affects noncitizens who are already here
o	If at time of entry or adjustment of stats he or she was in fact inadmissible, a noncitizen can be removed
o	Lawfulness of original admission can also affect eventual application for naturalization to USC
•	IIRAIRA § 302(a) amended INA § 235(a)(1) to say that an alien present in the US who has not been admitted shall be deemed for purposes of this Act an applicant for admission; as an applicant for admission, such a person becomes inadmissible under INA § 212(a)(6)(A)
•	Immigration Act of 1990 eliminated the exclusion of homosexuals; authorized HHS secretary to remove AIDS for list of diseases that render noncitizens inadmissible; modernized and narrowed the exclusions relating to mental illness; repealed exclusion grounds for illiteracy and mental retardation; and narrowed various exclusion grounds based on political beliefs, statements, and associations.  
o	Congress also added an exclusion ground for anyone whose entry or activities in the US might adversely affect US foreign policy

Grounds Related to Immigration Control
•	Integrity of documents – INA § 212(a)
o	Subsection 7(A) and 7(B): immigrants who are not in possession of valid passports and visas (or sometimes alternative entry documents, subject to discretionary waiver under § 212(k)
o	INA § 212(a)(5)(A): if no labor certification
o	INA § 212(a)(6)(D): stowaways
o	Provisions dealing specifically with fraud
•	INA § 274C: noncitizens who have committed specific forms of document fraud are subject to administrative fines; upon being ordered to pay such penalties, become excludable (INA § 212(a)(6)(F), subject to discretionary waivers
•	Noncitizens who procure visas, admission or certain other documents or benefits by fraud or misrepresentation become inadmissible for life.  INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(i)
•	False claims of citizenship (oral or written) constitute an independent ground for inadmissibility.  INA § 212(a)(6)(C)(ii)

•	Surreptitious entry – INA § 212(a)(6)(A)
o	IIRIRA renders inadmissible those noncitizens who are present in the US without having been admitted or paroled, as well as those who arrive other than at officially designated ports of entry
o	Assisting other noncitizens to enter unlawfully is also a ground for inadmissibility, subject to certain conditions and waivers.  INA §§ 212(a)(6)(E), 212(d)(11)

•	Out of status – INA § 212(a)(9)(B)
o	Renders certain noncitizens who have been unlawfully present in the US for 180 days or for one year inadmissible for three years or ten years respectively
o	INA § 212 (a)(9)(B)(ii): “unlawfully present” = present in the US after expiration of the period of stay authorized by the AG or is present in the US without being admitted or paroled
•	INS position: This section contemplates continuous unlawful presence, not an aggregate of two or more separate stays
•	INS position: Voluntary departure remedy; common for either the INS or an IJ to allow a person under certain circumstances to depart voluntarily rather than be formally removed
•	Person granted remedy of voluntary departure not considered unlawfully presence until the due date for his or her voluntary departure

•	No show provision – INA § 212(a)(6)(B)
o	Renders inadmissible for five years any noncitizen who, without reasonable cause, fails to attend his or her removal hearing
•	212(a)(9)(A): noncitizen who are ordered removed are generally inadmissible for either 5 or 10 years, depending on whether they were removed upon or after arrival
•	212(a)(9)(A)(ii): AG has discretion to waive this ground of inadmissibility by consenting to the person applying for admission

•	Aggregate provision – INA § 212(a)(9)(C)
o	Unlawful presence for aggregate period of more than one year or removal for any reason, and who then enters or attempt to enter without being admitted becomes inadmissible for at least ten years, after which the AG may grant permission to reapply for admission
•	Aggregate: two or more separate periods may be aggregated for purposes of this section 

•	Waivers – INA § 212(d)(3)
o	Joint AG and Secretary of State Waivers for nonimmigrants only.  

•	What happens if a nonimmigrant violates the terms of his or her admittance? 
o	Violation of terms makes person deportable (§ 237(a)(1)(C)(i)) but INA memo takes position that presence does not thereby become unlawful, and the 180 day and one year periods do not start to run until the IJ hears the case had determines that the violation has occurred
•	When does the clock begin to run for unlawful presence? 
o	INS: upon filing of notice to appear.  INA § 239(a)(1)
o	Executive Office for Immigration Review: time spent in removal proceedings is not unlawful presence
•	What happens if nonimmigrants apply for extensions or changes of status and INS does not decide on application for an extension or change until after the person’s original stay has expired?
o	INA § 212(a)(9)(B)(iv) tolls the accumulation of unlawful presence time during the period from expiration of the original stay to the time INS decides the application, provided that the application is nonfrivolous and the applicant has not worked without authorization

Political and National Security Grounds
General
•	1952 INA contained three broad exclusion grounds pertaining to either national security or political expression
•	INA § 212(a)(27): noncitizens believed to be entering the US to engage in activities prejudicial to the public interest
•	INA § 212(a)(28): anyone who had ever advocated, been members of or affiliated with any organization that advocated or published or circulated writings advocating, or the propriety of overthrowing the US gov’t or all gov’t.  
•	INA § 212(a)(29): noncitizens believed likely to engage, after entry, in such activities as espionage, sabotage or other subversion 
•	The only inadmissibility grounds that may not be waived for nonimmigrants under § 212(d)(3) are those that cover individuals believed to be entering to engage in espionage, sabotage, forceful overthrow of the gov’t or “other unlawful activity,” those relating to foreign policy, and the exclusion provision for WWII-era Nazis 

Criminal Grounds
General
•	INA § 212(a)(2) and 212(h)
•	One deportability ground is that the person has been convicted of an “aggravated felony.”
•	Relief under 212(h) is unavailable to anyone who has been convicted of an aggravated felony after having been admitted as an LPR.  
•	§ 212(h) disqualifies anyone who has previously been admitted as an LPR and who, since that admission, has not lawfully resided continuously in the US for at least 7 years “immediately preceding the initiation of removal proceedings

Economic Grounds
General
•	Only two explicitly economic grounds are left in the INA
o	INA § 212(a)(5)(A): Labor Certification
o	INA § 212(a)(4): Public Charge
•	Noncitizens “likely at any time to become public charges”
•	This has become the single most common affirmative substantive basis for denial of immigrant visas and one to the most common for nonimmigrants
•	State Department defines “public charge” = primarily dependent on the gov’t for subsistence as demonstrated by either the receipt of public cash assistance for income maintenance or institutionalization for long-term care at gov’t expense
•	Because of IIRIRA § 531(a), public charge exclusion ground now lays out the factors that will affect public charge determinations: age, health, family status, financial status, education, skills, and “affidavits of support.” INA § 212(a)(4)(B)
•	Affidavit of support: sponsor stated a willingness to come to the applicant’s aid in the event aid is later needed
•	Affidavit of support is a binding contract, legally enforceable against the sponsor by the sponsored immigrant, the Federal Government, any state (or political subdivision of such state), or by any other entity that provides any means-tested public benefit.  INA § 213A(a)(1)(B).  Binding for 40 qualifying quarter years after the immigrant last receives benefits or until naturalization.
•	Sponsor must be US national or an LPR over age 18 and domiciled in the US.  Sponsor must be the person who is petitioning for the immigrant’s admission.  If petitioner lacks the required resources, he or she can join with another person as a co-sponsor.  
•	Sponsor’s income must be at least 125% of the poverty level.  For immediate relative and family-sponsored petitions, affidavits of support are mandatory.  INA § 212(a)(4)(C). 
•	AG has discretion to waive the public charge ground upon giving of “pubic charge” bond.  INA § 213.  Person who furnishes bond promises to indemnify the US or any state or local governmental unit in which sponsored individual becomes a public charge. 

•	IIRIRA § 352 added a new exclusion ground for those who formally renounce their US citizenship “for the purpose of avoiding taxation by the US.”  INA § 212(a)(10)(E)

Public Health and Morals
General
•	Health and safety grounds describe various physical and mental disorders.  INA § 212(a)(1)
•	Immigration Act of 1990 narrowed the list; now, neither a physical nor mental disorder is generally a basis for exclusion unless the associated behavior poses one of several specific threats.  INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(i).
o	Discretionary waivers are possible.  INA § 212(g)(2)
o	Drug addicts and drug abusers are specifically inadmissible. INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(iii).
•	National Institutes of Health Revitalization Act of 1993 amended INA § 212(a)(1)(A)(i) to expressly exclude noncitizens who are determined by DHHS to have a communicable disease of public health significance, including HIV.  
o	AG can waive that exclusion ground for spouses and other close family members of USC or LPRs.  
•	Some exclusion grounds are rooted in congressional perceptions of public morality.  INA § 212(a)(9)(A) (polygamy) and INA § 212(a)(2)(D) (prostitution or other commercialized vice, even absent criminal convictions)

Admission Procedure
Visa Petitions
Modern Procedure: Preliminary Comments
•	Four Hurdles: Multi-step process
o	Labor Certification: applies only to individuals who seek certain statuses.  INA § 212(a)(5)(A)
•	Immigrants applying under the second and third employment-based preferences
•	Employers of certain nonimmigrants must apply for labor certification or, in some instances, file labor condition applications (LCAs)
o	Visa Petition: limited to certain statuses
•	Visa petition filed with the INS; purpose to establish that the noncitizen beneficiary meets the definition of the particular status
o	Getting the Visa
•	Once the INS has approved a visa petition, the beneficiary next files a visa application with the appropriate US consulate abroad
•	Must persuade the consulate that he fits the definition of the applicable status and also that non of the affirmative grounds for inadmissibility applies
•	More resource-intensive background checks for greater numbers of visa applicants since 9/11
o	Actual Admission to the US
•	Appears at authorized entry point and formally applies for admission
•	Visa is essential to admission but does not guarantee admission
•	INS inspector may reexamine the noncitizen to assure that none of the statutory inadmissibility grounds applies
•	Each time you reenter, grounds for inadmissibility apply

Petitions in General
•	For the petitions for visa, there is a petitioner and beneficiary.  
•	If the petitioner dies, withdraws the petition, or if relationship changes, (i.e. marriage and then divorce) then petition is no longer valid.  There is new legislation that says petition lives if petitioner died in WTC disaster. The petitioner is in control.  
•	Visas are for entry.  Having a 10 year visa means you can come in and out of the country with that visa for 10 years.  Status is granted by INS, they set the time limit for visit (State Dept).
•	In order to enter the country, must have the status on the application at the time you immigrate.  If you are listed as an unmarried son on the petition, you must be when you cross the border.
•	Brothers and sisters are so back-logged because there is a very low quota (public policy issue not as important); you can have one spouse and two parents, but several brothers and sisters.  
•	Immigrants enjoy far greater benefits than nonimmigrants.  Immigrants may remain in US so long as they refrain from any types of deportable behavior.  In turn, immigrants face more difficult entry restrictions/requirements.  

What Types of Visa Petitions for Immigrants?
•	I-130  visa petition filed with INS on behalf of immediate relatives and family-based preference immigrants.
•	I-140  visa petition generally filed with the INS for employment-based immigrants.  

Who must file the Visa Petition?
•	Normally, in immediate relative and family pref cases, pertinent American relative must file the visa petition.  
•	Certain employment-based 1st pref may petition for themselves or have others, such as employers, petition for them.  For other e-based petitions, employer must petition.  

How is the system run?  What process is due a person petitioning for a Visa?
•	The system is now run regionally and some US consulates handle cases that are “clearly approvable.”
•	All visa petitions MUST BE SUPPORTED by docs that establish the essential facts.  
•	Petitioner has no right to be heard orally, but if the petition is about to be denied on the basis of derogatory non-classified info of which the petitioner of beneficiary is unaware, s/he must be given that info and an opportunity to respond in accordance with balancing test of Mathews.  
•	When petition is denied, reasons must be stated.  Denials are subject to administrative and judicial review.  

Visa Applications
•	Hermina Sague v. U.S. (D.P.R. 1976) pg. 445
Facts: French citizen married USC and two years later applied for visa at the consular officer in France; application denied on ineligibility under INA § 212(a).  Plaintiffs contend that denial of visa deprived them of enjoying a family life together with relatives in the US; challenge constitutionality of INA.  INS/gov’t claimed that district court lacked SM jurisdiction because it would constitute judicial review of consular officer’s decision.  
Holding: Court does lack jurisdiction to review consular decisions; consular officer’s decisions to grant or deny visa are not subject to judicial review.  As to the constitutional question, court held that there is no constitutional right of a citizen’s spouse who voluntarily chooses to marry an alien to have alien spouse enter the US.  

Actual Admission
At the Border
•	Immigration inspector must determine whether any inadmissibility grounds under INS § 212(a) appear to apply
•	Expedited removal: Immigration officers at ports of entry are authorized to remove certain arriving noncitizens through special process of expedited removal or summary exclusion
•	When regular process applies, though, the immigration officer decides whether the noncitizen is “clearly and beyond a doubt entitled t be admitted.”
o	If so, then person is admitted
o	If not, person “shall be detained” for a removal proceeding.  INA § 235(b)(2)(A)
•	AG has discretion to parole a noncitizen into the US temporarily for emergent reasons, subject to some constraints in the case of certain individuals who are removable on criminal or national security grounds.  INA §§ 212(d)(5), 236

Hearings before Immigration Judges
•	AG has discretion to permit noncitizens to withdraw their applications for admission and depart immediately.  INA § 235(a)(4).  Since formal removal order bars future admission for up to five years (and longer for second removals and for aggravated felons), vast majority give up and go home.  
•	Removal proceeding formally begins when INS serves Notice to Appear on the noncitizen
o	This specifies the time and place of the hearing, the alleged facts and charged exclusion grounds, and the person’s procedural rights.  INA § 239(a)
o	To afford the person opportunity to secure counsel, the hearing may not start until ten days after service, unless the noncitizen requests an earlier date
o	Hearing may proceed without counsel.  INA § 239(b)(3)
•	Government’s burden to prove grounds for deportability; contained in Notice to Appear
o	Passport will prove citizenship (non-US)
o	If person is there, can prove remaining in US beyond period permitted
o	Charges look back to status as you entered and why now removable (doesn’t matter if reason why you have stayed is that you were waiting for IJ to rule on asylum petition)

•	INA § 291 makes clear that arriving noncitizen bears burden of proving admissibility
o	INA § 240(c)(2)(A): applicant for admission must prove that she is “clearly and beyond doubt entitled to be admitted and is not inadmissible under section 212
•	This test seems to not even allow a “reasonable” doubt
•	But, does phrase “clearly and beyond doubt” modify only “entitled to be admitted,” or does it also modify “and is not admissible?”
•	Under this test, noncitizen would have to prove his or her affirmative credentials clearly and beyond doubt and would have to prove by some unspecified standard that none of the inadmissibility grounds apply
•	Under INA § 240(c)(2)(B), noncitizen must make showing that they are admissible or that they have been lawfully admitted by “clear and convincing evidence” 

•	If charge is entry without inspection
o	Government has burden to prove alienage
o	Respondent must prove entry with inspection (time, place and manner of entry)

Expedited Removal
•	Once immigration inspector concludes that noncitizen is inadmissible under the two listed grounds, person is ordered removed without further hearing.  INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i)
•	No administrative appeal except for returning LPRs, admitted refugees and people who have already received asylum
•	No judicial review of “whether the alien is actually inadmissible or entitled to any relief from removal
o	Only permissible judicial review of expedited removals is on the issues of whether the person is a citizen, whether the person was in fact ordered removed, and whether the person comes within one of the above exceptions (LPRs, refugees, asylees).  INA § 242(e)(2)

Adjustment of Status – INA § 245
•	Adjustment applicant must be admissible as an immigrant and the particular immigrant category must be current.  INA § 245(a)
•	Aliens who entered without inspection were afforded a type of relief in §245(i), which allowed people to pay $1000 penalty fee.   
•	There are some extra requirements and until 1990 alien had to have been inspected and admitted or paroled.  
•	Affirmative disqualifications include: alien crew members, aliens out of status at any time after entry, aliens admitted without visas.  
•	Normally no appeal from denying an application for adjustment of status.  

Deportability Grounds

Meaning and Significance of “Entry” and “Admission”
General
•	Until IIRIRA, one of the most important words in immigration law was “entry”
o	No deportation proceeding could be brought unless the noncitizen had made entry
o	Manner or timing of entry was essential element of most of the specific deportation grounds enumerated in pre-IIRIRA version of the INA
o	Entry into the US was an essential element of certain criminal offenses
•	Now, admission, not entry, determines whether a noncitizen will be subject to inadmissibility grounds or deportability grounds.  INA § 240(e)(2)
o	IIRIRA § 308(f) amended many of the specific inadmissibility grounds by replacing entry with admission
•	Entry is still a crucial concept for several reasons
o	Some of the inadmissibility grounds still use either the work entry or the word enter
o	Some of the deportability also use those terms
o	Congress’ decision to change only selected grounds intact was deliberate
o	Entry can also make a difference when it comes to procedure
o	Even where Congress did replace entry with admission, the definition of admission refers to entry

•	Rosenberg v. Fleuti (S. Ct. 1963) pg. 482 – Meaningful interruption of LPR = subject to entry/brief, innocent, casual test
Facts: Respondent (Swiss national) was admitted as LPR in 1952 and has been here ever since except for very short trip to Mexico in August 1956.  Petitioner is LA Dir. of the INS and he wants to deport respondent on the ground that at time or return he was “within one or more of the classes of aliens excludable by the law existing at the time of such entry” – i.e. he was gay.  Deportation ordered and appeal to BIA dismissed; he then brought this action for declaratory judgment and review of the administrative action.  One of the issues to be litigated was constitutionality of §212(a)(4) as “vague and ambiguous.”  Trial court allowed US motion for SJ.  9th Cir set aside deportation order and issued an injunction, holding that “as applied to Fleuti §212(a)(4) was unconstitutionally vague in that homosexuality was not sufficiently encompassed within the term ‘psychopathic personality.’”  
Holding: Fleuti did not have to make entry after being in Mexico for a couple of hours.  Court looks at DiPasquale (2nd Cir said that Congress could never have intended for entry to apply to someone who was unintentionally taken out of US on a train trip) and Delgadillo (taken to Cuba to recuperate after his merchant ship was bombed in WWII) and legislative history to conclude that Congress could never have intended entry to include some little trip this insignificant.  This cannot be the definition – too limited.  The court looks to the holdings of those cases which said that an alien does not make entry where 1) there was no intent to leave the US or 2) the alien did not leave voluntarily.  Court eventually comes up with the following definition of intent (to leave US): intent to depart in manner which can be regarded as meaningfully interruptive of the alien’s LPR.  Some factors to consider include: 1) length of absence, 2) purpose of absence, and 3) documentation needed to leave.  Now test is whether the trip was brief, innocent, and casual.  
Dissent:  No rationale or textually true reading could result in this guy not having to make entry.  He intended to leave, recent Congressional amendment includes voluntary departures and so this is improper.  

Crime-related Deportability Grounds
General – INA § 237(a)(2)
•	Criminal activity can affect a noncitizens immigration status in various ways
o	Constitute a ground for inadmissibitly or a ground for deportability or both
o	Destroy a parsons statutory eligibility for various forms of affirmative relief from removal
o	Determine whether a person will be detained while removal proceedings are pending
o	Make a person ineligible for naturalization
o	Weight against the favorable exercise of administrative discretion in a wide range of contexts
•	Study found immigrants less likely to be institutionalized than native-born and much less likely to be institutionalized than native-born men with similar demographic characteristics
•	Stream of amendments has expanded the crime-related inadmissibility and deportability grounds, narrowed availability of discretionary relief, added to the powers of law enforcement personnel, and abbreviated the procedures used in selected categories of crime-related removal cases

Erasing a Conviction – Withdrawing Guilty Pleas
•	United States v. Parrino (2nd Cir. 1954) pg. 508
Facts: Defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to kidnap; motion filed to vacate judgment of conviction and to permit defendant to withdraw prior plea of guilty on the ground that pled guilty only in reliance on assurance of counsel at the time that the plea would not have effect on subjecting him to deportation.  
Holding: Affirmed order because unsound to hold that such defendants are subjected to manifest injustice if held to their plea merely because they did not understand or foresee such collateral consequences.  Subject matter of claimed surprise was not the severity of the sentence by the collateral consequence, namely deportability.  
Dissent:  Where a Rule says to avoid manifest injustice, should do so.  Here, the sentence is two years in jail and a lifetime in exile.  This is manifest injustice.  

•	People v. Pozo (Colo. 1987) pg. 513
Facts: Defendant from Cuba, alien legally residing in the US; pled guilty to second degree sexual assault and to escape.  Asserted that he did not receive effective counsel because trial counsel did not advise him of the possible deportation consequences of his guilty pleas.  Court of appeals reversed trial court’s ruling and remanded case to trial court with directions to reinstate original charges and allow Pozo to plead anew. 
Holding: Potential deportation consequences of guilty pleas in criminal proceedings are material to critical phases of such proceedings; failure to investigate those consequences constitutes ineffective counsel.  Reversed and remanded to trial court for further proceedings.  
Dissent: Guilty pleas are not constitutionally infirm and would affirm trial court’s order.  

Crimes Involving Moral Turpitude
•	Covered by INA §§ 237(a)(2)(A)(i and ii): certain non citizens who have been convicted of one or more crimes involving “moral turpitude”
•	Within 5 years after date of admission; sentence (potential, not actual) of 1 year
•	Crimes include: theft, fraud/deceit, sex, violence and other crimes (must make arguments)
o	Marciano v. INS (8th Cir. 1971)
Facts: Petitioner convicted of statutory rape and sentence to 3 years in prison; contends that conviction does not form basis for deportation because phrase “crime involving moral turpitude” is constitutionally vague and the statutes of which he stands convicted is not a crime involving moral turpitude because the statute makes sexual relations with a female between 16 and 18 a crime without any proof of criminal intent and a defense of reasonable mistake is unavailable
Holding: Constitutional question is foreclosed by prior rejection by Supreme Court.  Rejects second contention that statutory rape offense is not a crime of moral turpitude.  Deportation order affirmed.

Aggravated Felonies
•	Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988 created new concept called “aggravated felony” and rendered deportable any noncitizen who, after admission, has been convicted of an aggravated felony.  INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii)
•	Major consequences: 
o	Aggravated felonies do not have to be committed within five years of admission in order to give rise to deportability
o	Aggravated felony makes a person deportable without regard to potential or actual sentence
o	Eliminates most discretionary relief possibilities, deletes certain procedural safeguards, triggers mandatory detention, prevents person after removal from ever returning to the US, subjects person to 20 year prison term if found in the US unlawfully
•	Immigration Act of 1990 § 501(a)(3): aggravated felony is “any crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment imposed is at least 5 years
•	Immigration and Nationality Technical Corrections Act of 1994: added theft, burglary, trafficking in fraudulent documents, violations of RICO, provided that sentence of at least 5 years was imposed
•	AEDPA § 440(e): reduced 5 year sentence requirement s of document fraud prong, added commercial bribery, counterfeiting, forgery, stolen vehicle trafficking, obstruction of justice, perjury and bribery, provided that a sentence of at least 5 years may be imposed
•	IIRIRA § 321: added rape and sexual abuse of a minor; reduced from 5 years to 1 year the sentence-imposed requirements for crimes of violence and those listed above

•	Matter of Crammond (BIA 2001) pg. 542
Facts: LPR from Belize convicted of residential burglary and unlawful sexual intercourse; alleged that sexual intercourse offense could not be aggravated felony because state court reduced the offense from a felony to a misdemeanor
Holding: Interpretation of INA § 101(a)(43)(A) unclear; felony conviction for murder, rape or sexual abuse of a minor and that the accepted federal definition of “felony” applies in determining whether respondent’s state conviction constitutes a felony.  New evidence presented by plaintiff is material and granted motion to reopen and remand to IJ for further proceedings.

•	Miscellaneous Criminal Grounds under § 237
o	2(C): Firearms offenses
o	2(D): National security offenses
o	2(E): Domestic violence
o	3(B): failure to register and document fraud
o	None of these require particular sentence or that crime be committed within a certain number of years

•	Nonimmigrant who fails to maintain status or to comply with the conditions of that status is deportable under INA § 237(a)(1)(C)(i)

Relief from Deportability

Types of Relief from Removal	
•	Termination of Proceedings
•	Asylum § 208
•	Withholding of Removal ?????
•	Adjustment of Status § 245
•	Cancellation of Removal § 240(A)
•	Waiver of Inadmissibility
•	Voluntary Departure – persons of good moral character with the ability to immediately depart are eligible (if have crime, normally won’t get)	

General
•	Relief provisions can be thought of as affirmative defenses—i.e., defenses for which the noncitizen had the burden of proof
o	Do not include defense that is an essential element of the particular deportability ground 
o	Also omitted are few affirmative relief provisions that are specific to particular deportability grounds
•	Some of these remedies can waive inadmissibility as well as deportability
•	All relief provisions have different requirement and different consequences.  Some variables that distinguish these remedies
o	Kinds of charges to which the provision supplies a defense
o	Requisites to obtaining relief
o	Whether relief is automatic or subject to exercise of discretion
o	How far-reaching the consequences are (permitting person to remain permanently or simply putting removal on temporary hold or something lesser)
o	Who decides whether to grant relief (IJ and BIA in removal proceedings or the INS outside removal) 
•	Limitations: 
o	Individuals who are properly notified of removal hearings and fail to appear or who receive voluntary departure and fail to leave on time are ineligible to apply for any of several remedies for ten years.  INA §§ 240(b)(7) and 240B(d)
o	Aggravated felons are expressly disqualified from most of the major relief provisions, including cancellation of removal, voluntary departure and registry.
•	Conviction of aggravated felony precludes a showing of good moral character (INA § 101(f)(8)), which is a prerequisite of several relief provisions.  
o	Anyone who is deportable on terrorist grounds barred from several forms of discretionary relief.  This is a result of AEDPA § 413(b,c, d, and e)
o	IIRIA § 306(a)(2) curtailed judicial review of denials of discretionary relief.  Amended INA § 242(a)(2)(B) to bar judicial review of any judgment regard the granting of relief under certain provisions

Lasting Relief
Cancellation of Removal in General
•	INA § 240A(a): remedy only available to certain LPRS; most commonly used in cases where deportability charges stem from criminal convictions
•	INA § 240A(b): cancellation of removal fro “certain nonpermanent residents” but noting in the actual text precludes use of part (b) by those LPRs who do not meet all of the requirements of (a)

Cancellation of Removal: Part B (formally Suspension of Deportation)
•	Used to be called suspension of deportation.  Can be invoked by anyone who otherwise meets the requirements; in practice, the principal beneficiaries of part B are undocumented immigrants
o	Available to both inadmissible and deportable noncitizens
o	Two separate branches of cancellation part B – a general branch and a special branch for battered spouses and battered children
o	Applicants have two separate hurdles: establish statutory eligibility and then they must receive favorable exercise of discretion
•	Requirements: 
o	Extreme hardship to family (LPR/USC)
o	Physically present for 10 years
o	Good moral character

•	Continuous physical presence
o	INA § 240A(b)(1)(A) requires physical presence for a continuous period of not less than 10 years immediate preceding the date of application
o	Physical presence requirement reflects several changes introduced by IIRIRA
•	Increased length of period form 7 to 10 years
•	Preserved practice of permitting temporary absences, but replaced flexible test (innocent, casual, brief, and no meaningful interruption (Fleuti)) with two bright line tests: INA §240A(d)(2)
•	Single departure of more than 90 days automatically destroys continuous physical presence
•	Cumulative absences of more than 180 days automatically destroy continuous physical presence
•	Hardship
o	Issue of when hardship is “extreme” (now “exceptional and extremely unusual”) comes up I two distinct settings: 
(1) Noncitizen in removal proceedings applies to IJ for cancellation
•	Applicant has burden of establishing the required hardship
•	IIRIRA § 306(a)(2) bars judicial review of any judgment regarding granting of relief under section 240A
(2) Noncitizen is ineligible of cancellation at the time of removal proceedings but becomes eligible before actual removal
•	Move to reopen removal proceedings; IJ and BIA have discretion to grant or deny a motion to reopen
•	If granted, and if its purpose was to enable the person to apply for cancellation, noncitizen then files cancellation application with the IJ at the reopened hearing
•	If denied, denial is appealable to BIA
o	Substantive decision to grant cancellation of removal avoids removal and confers LPR status
o	Decision to reopen entitles the person only to evidentiary hearing at which he or she will have the opportunity to prove the facts necessary for cancellation (and possibly temporary stay of removal)

o	INA v. Jong Ha Wang (S. Ct. 1981) pg 586
Facts: Respondents husband and wife from Korea entered the US in 1970 as nonimmigrant treaty traders authorized to stay until Jan. 1972; remained beyond that date and found deportable after a hearing in Nov. 1974.  Granted privilege of voluntary departure but did not do so; applied for adjustment of status under § 245 but found ineligible for such relief.  Filed motion to reopen deportation proceedings under § 244, since they had satisfied the 7 year continuous physical presence requirement.  Alleged that deportation would result in extreme hardship to tow American born children because neither child spoke Korean and would lose “educational opportunities.” Also claimed economic hardship to them resulting from forced liquidation of their assets.  9th Cir reversed BIA’s holding that respondents alleged insufficient facts to establish extreme hardship.  That court reasoned that statue should be liberally construed.
Holding: Reversed Court of Appeals’ judgment because of error in two respects.  (1) Ignored regulation requiring the alien seeking suspension to allege and support by affidavit or other evidentiary material the particular facts to constitute extreme hardship; (2) encroach on the authority which the INA confers on AG as to what constitutes “extreme hardship.”  Construction and application of this standard should not be overturned by a reviewing court simply because it may prefer another interpretation of the statute.  BIA found that mere showing of economic detriment insufficient to satisfy requirements of § 244; two children would not suffer economic or education deprivation.  

o	Hee Yung Ahn v. INS (9th Cir. 1981) pg. 595
Facts: Ahns seek suspension of deportation, arguing that they will suffer extreme hardship if deported.  IJ and BIA concluded that they had not shown extreme hardship.
Holding: Decline to disturb the order denying suspension of deportation.  BIA has broad discretion in determining what constitutes extreme hardship, as the Supreme Court held in Wang.  If the BIA decides to define it narrowly, that is within its discretion.  

•	NACARA: granted special dispensations to nationals of certain named countries
o	Amnesty for nationals of Nicaragua and Cuba; more limited amnesty for certain Haitian nationals
o	For nationals of Guatemala, El Salvador, former USSR and most Easter European nationals: right to apply for cancellation of removal (and adjustment of status) under less onerous substantive criteria
•	Referred to as “special rule” cancellation.  Extends to spouse, child and adult son or daughter
•	Must have entered before specified dated in 1990
o	DOJ’s interim rules on NACARA of June 21, 1999
•	Rebuttable presumption of extreme hardship for most of the Guatemalans and Salvadorans
•	INS has burden of proving that removal will not cause extreme hardship
•	Showing there is no evidence at all of extreme hardship
•	Showing that applicant has great wealth in home country
•	Registry – INA § 249
o	Confers discretionary authority on AG to award LPR status to certain noncitizens who enter US before a specified date
o	Applicant may not fall within any of the more serious exclusion grounds
o	Must have maintained continuous residence
o	Must be of good moral character
o	Must be ineligible for citizenship
o	Generally unavailable for ten years to individuals who have failed to appear at removal hearing or to comply with voluntary departure orders

•	Legalization
o	Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986: wide-range of strategies designed to reduce undocumented immigrant population of the US
•	Imposed sanctions on anyone who employs unauthorized workers
•	Three legalization programs
•	General legalization plan
•	Special legalization program for agricultural workers
•	Special program for Cubans and Haitians
o	Legalization: Allows certain noncitizens who had been residing unlawfully in the US for several years to regularize their status
•	Realistic appreciation that millions of immigrants living underground would never be apprehended and removed
•	Social harms that inevitably flow from the existence of huge underground subculture
•	Compassion for people who had become part of American society

Removal Procedure
Overview
Apprehension
•	INA charges the AG with administration and enforcement of immigration laws; gives AG both power and duty to control and guard the boundaries and borders of the US against illegal entry of aliens.  INA § 103(a)(4)
•	Specific powers that designated INS employees may exercise without a search or arrest warrant.  INA § 287(a)
o	Interrogate any person believed to be a noncitizen as to his right to be in the US
o	Arrest any noncitizen in the country if there is “reason to believe that the alien so arrested in the US in violation [of the immigration laws] and is likely to escape before [an arrest] warrant can be obtained”
o	Within a reasonable distance from any external boundary, power to board any vessel within US territorial waters and any train, aircraft or other vehicle for purpose of searching for noncitizens
o	Within 25 miles of any external boundary, power to enter private lands other than dwellings for the purpose of patrolling the border
•	Courts have recognized various Fourth Amendment limitations
o	In certain situations, immigration officer must have a “reasonable suspicion” that the subject is not a citizen
o	Other situations, must have reasonable suspicion and also that he is in US in violation of law
o	Other actions require probable cause to believe person ins a noncitizen who is here unlawfully

Before the Hearing
•	Within 48 hours of arrest (7 days for those certified as suspected terrorists under the USA PATRIOT Act), must decide whether there is prima facie evidence that the arrested alien is in the US in violation of law
o	If so, INS issues Notice to Appear
o	Noncitizen or counsel appears at master calendar hearing
•	During 48 hour period, INS must decide whether to detain the person pending a final removal decision.
o	Detention is mandatory for certain categories of noncitizens
o	All other cases INS has discretion whether to detain the person without bond, release on cash bond of at least $ 1500, or release on conditional parole.  INA § 236(a)
•	Bond determination
o	Immigration Officer will make the decision on whether to set bond.  Bonds require noncitizen to furnish full amounts
o	Bond factors in immigration are same factors applied in criminal case: 
•	Flight risk
•	Danger to community (community contacts is favorable to alien)
o	If bond is too high, can ask for bond redetermination, which is a hearing before an IJ.  Can make case to IJ about factors.  IJ can raise or lower bond.  
o	There is much more difficulty now getting someone out on bond, even someone without any prior security charges.  

Removal Hearing
•	Supreme Court has interpreted the INA as exempting removal hearings from procedures laid out in APA
•	INS has burden of proving by clear and convincing evidence that the subject of the hearing is a noncitizen
•	Burden shifts to noncitizen to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he or she is lawfully present pursuant to a prior admission.  INS § 240(b)(2)(B)
•	Burden shifts back to INS to prove alleged deportability grounds by clear and convincing evidence
•	If deportability is contested, INS presents its case firs; ten noncitizen presents his case
•	If IJ finds person deportable, hearing may enter a second phase in which noncitizens applies for one or more forms of affirmative relief
o	Voluntary departure, cancellation of removal, adjustment, asylum)
•	IJ decision must contain findings as to deportability and IJ’s reasons; also must contain formal order directing removal to a specified country, terminating proceedings, or otherwise disposing of the case. 

Administrative Review
•	Either the noncitizen or the INS may appeal the IJ decision to the BIA
•	Appellant must file with IJ no later than 30 days after service of the decision, a notice of appeal summarizing grounds for appeal
•	Filing of notice automatically stays execution of IJ’s decision
•	BIA review confined to the record, but its decisions require independent substitution of judgment.  In practice, BIA normally defers to the credibility determinations of the IJ
•	BIA has power to summarily dismiss an appeal if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact
•	DOJ 199 rule that authorizes one-member decisions “without opinion” in a wide variety of cases that the member believes do not raise significant factual or legal issues
•	BIA also permitted to render nine-member en banc decisions
•	AG has power to review BIA decisions; this power is usually exercised only when case raises exceptionally important questions of law or policy

Judicial Review
•	Ordinarily the exclusive procedure for judicial review of removal order is to file a petition for review in the US Court of Appeals for the circuit in which the removal hearing was held
•	Provisions of IIRIRA render some of the most important removal orders immune from judicial review
o	Expedited removal
o	Most removal orders based on crime-related deportability grounds
o	Almost all denials of discretionary relief
•	Petitioner must exhaust all administrative remedies; must be filed within 30 days of final removal order
•	Service of petition for review on the INS no longer stays the removal unless the court affirmatively declares otherwise.  INA § 242(b)(3)(B)
•	Reviewing court decides case on administrative record, not by taking new evidence of its own

Execution of the Removal Order
•	IIRIRA tightened rules for executing final orders of removal
o	AG to remove noncitizens within 90 days of when orders become administratively final. INA § 241(a)(1)
o	AG shall detain the alien during the removal period.  INA § 241(a)(2)
•	Removal can be delayed if a stay is granted in connection with motion to reopen or reconsider
•	If no stays or other formal barriers remain, INS prepares to execute the removal order
o	Noncitizens cooperation is important, and IIRIRA imposes civil fins on any noncitizen who fails to make timely application in good faith for the necessary travel documents, willfully fails to depart, or otherwise hampers departure

Representation
General
•	In removal proceedings, noncitizen can be represented by counsel.  INA § 240(b)(4)(A)
o	Attorney must be authorized to practice under statutory and regulatory provisions
o	Attorneys who practice in immigration proceedings before the INS or EOIR subject to additional rules

•	Legal Aid
o	IJ must advise the respondent of availability of free legal services programs
o	1982 Legal Services Corporation (LSC) prohibits LSC grantees (legal aid organizations) from using LSC funds to provide legal assistance to most categories of noncitizens
•	Only noncitizens eligible under that legislation are (1) LPRs; (2) those who possess specified relationships to USC, have already applied for adjustment of status and have not yet been rejected; (3) those who have been granted refugee or asylum status; (4) certain battered spouses and children
o	Since 1986, LSC funds have been available to H2A nonimmigrants but not for immigration matters
o	1996 legislation prohibits grant of LSC funds to any person or entity that provides legal aid to any alien, unless the alien is present in the US and is within one of the eligible categories described above
•	This prevents LSC grantees from representing almost all noncitizens in removal proceedings, even if they use funding that private donors have specifically earmarked for that purpose

•	Pro Bono Legal Services
o	More elusive for noncitizens in removal proceedings because the INS relies more heavily on large detention centers generally located in remote areas where there are few attorneys

•	Equal Access to Justice Act
o	Ardestani v. INS (S. Ct. 1991) pg. 667 – EAJA does not allow atty’s fees in admin proceeding
Facts: Ardestani is Iranian woman who was at removal hearing but successfully renewed her application for asylum (which had previously been stripped after INS said she had reached safe haven in Luxembourg before coming to US).  EAJA says prevailing parties in certain adversary administrative proceedings can recover attorney’s fees & costs from government unless the award would be unjust or the agency position is substantially justified.  Adversary adjudication means that US was represented by counsel or otherwise.  IJ awarded attorney fees; BIA vacated and denied ground on basis that AG has determined that deportation proceedings are not within scope of the EAJA.  11th circuit denied petition for review and held that EAJA does not apply to administrative deportation proceedings.
Holding: Affirmed – EAJA does not apply to admin deportation proceedings.  Immigration proceedings are not governed under the APA, the INA is the sole and exclusive procedure for determining deportability of an alien.  The court looks at plain meaning and says plain meaning of “under” would mean that §554 applies to immigration proceedings and it does not.  There is also no conclusive statement in legislative history in favor of any interpretation, certainly not hers.  Finally, the legislative purpose does not show intent to include administrative deportation proceedings under EAJA.  Can’t just allow waiver of SI haphazardly, must be construed strictly.  It is in the public interest to have the government act reasonably.  EAJA is set up to help the little guy fight the big guy.  Can still get attorney’s fees under EAJA in federal court cases, not administrative deportation proceedings (before IJ and BIA).  

Standard of INS is reasonable suspicion that someone is an illegal alien, if have this based upon articulable facts then can stop and arrest suspected illegal alien.  

Evidence and Proof
Admissibility of Evidence
•	Formal rules of evidence do not apply; hearsay is admissible in removal proceedings
•	Fundamental fairness requires gov’t to make reasonable effort to produce the witness at the hearing before resorting to hearsay
•	May evidence that the gov’t obtained illegally be introduced in removal hearings? 
o	INS v. Lopez-Mendoza (S. Ct. 1984) pg. 681
Issue: While every person has 4th Amendment rights, do aliens have right to suppress evidence where obtained in violation of 4th Amendment?  Must an admission of unlawful presence in this country made subsequent to an allegedly unlawful arrest be excluded in a civil deportation hearing?
Facts: INS agents showed up auto shop where L-M worked and although boss said not to talk to employees during work, one agent did talk to L-M and he let it slip that he was from Mexico so he got arrested and on further interrogation he admitted more incriminating things.  S-S was working at potato processing plant and got arrested there one day as he was leaving work.  The INS basically used body language to determine who they should question that day.  They questioned S-S without notifying him of his right to remain silent and he admitted that he unlawfully entered.  Ordered deported, BIA affirmed, 9th circuit reversed Sandoval-Sanchez deportation order and vacated & remanded Lopez-Mendoza’s.  S-S reversed because admission of illegal presence in course of unlawful arrest, and L-M to determine whether 4th Amendment had been violated in course of his arrest (sent to BIA for this determination).

Holding: Exclusionary rule need not be applied in such a proceeding.  Really, application of the exclusionary rule to civil deportation proceedings justified only if the rule will likely add significant protection to 4th amendment rights and in this case it just doesn’t.  Once the INS shows ID and alienage, burden shifts to alien to show place, time and manner of entry.  Because can’t suppress his ID and alienage, court of app decision re: L-M must be reversed.  The court looks to the balancing test in Janis (weighing the social benefits of excluding unlawfully seized evidence against costs) to determine if exclusionary rule should apply.  The court says that the deterrent value usually attributed to the exclusionary rule does not really apply here because hardly any aliens challenge the circumstances of their arrest so how would these restrictions affect INS agent behavior?  Additionally, the INA already has a scheme for preventing and deterring 4th amendment violations.  Finally, availability of alternative remedies for institutional practices (i.e. declaratory judgment) makes deterrent effect smaller still.  We don’t want to complicate immigration proceedings.  Too burdensome to make INS responsible for knowing 4th Amendment in civil proceedings.

5-4 decision: Making the arguments for both sides
Government/INS (Majority)	Alien (Dissent	
•	Civil proceeding
•	Alternative remedies (disciplinary proceedings, injunctive relief, complain to AG)
•	Continuing violation
•	Streamlined procedure
•	No deterrent if over 97% don’t contest	•	Deportation can be equated to criminal proceeding; arguably more severe
•	No meaningful alternative remedy (hardly ever disciplined for 4th A violation; cannot bring lawsuit once deported; unrealistic remedies)
•	Not a crime, but a misdemeanor
•	Shouldn’t subordinate constitutional rights to expediency
•	Plays role in alien’s decision whether to contest	

•	Other Illegally Obtained Statements
o	Lopez-Mendoza Court leaves open whether egregious violations of Fourth Amendment or other liberties might compel contrary results
•	Fifth Amendment due process makes illegally coerced statement suppressible in deportation hearings.  
•	INA § 235(a)(5) states that applicant for admission may be required to state under oath any information sought be an immigration officer regarding whether the applicant is inadmissible
•	DOJ regulations say that INS must prove that noncitizen is in fact a noncitizen before that person is deemed an applicant for admission and therefore subject to requirement of INA § 235(a)(5)
•	Does this violate the 5th A privilege against self-incrimination? 

o	Navia-Duran v. INS (1st Cir. 1977) printout – Coerced confession and signed statement – 5th A
Facts: Petitioner entered US with temporary visa and remained beyond its expiration.  One evening, agents of INS approached petitioner at her home and questioned her concerning her alleged alien status.  After hours of interrogation at INS headquarters, petitioner signed a statement admitting her illegal presence in the US.  On sole basis of her statement petitioner was found deportable.  BIA affirmed.  
Holding: Coerced statement was inadmissible and since this was the only basis for her deportation, deportation order was unsupported.  Petitioner was entitled to due process rights under 5th A in her deportation hearing, but these rights were not observed.  The totality of the circumstances surrounding petitioner’s apprehension and interrogation established the order of deportation was rendered in violation of due process and therefore, order was vacated and remanded for a new hearing.  Form used didn’t comport to regulations at the time (not translated into Spanish, Miranda rights misleading); had to have been informed of right to attorney and that evidence could be used against her.  

•	Burden of Proof and Sufficiency of the Evidence
o	Woodby v. INS (S. Ct. 1966) pg. 701
Facts: Petitioner is alien from Poland who entered as 14 year old in 1920; in 1963, INS instituted deportation proceedings on ground that he re-entered US in 1938 without inspection.  BIA dismissed appeal.  Governments evidence showed that petitioner obtained passport representing himself as USC.  2nd Circuit set aside deportation order on ground that gov’t has burden of proving the facts supporting deportability beyond a reasonable doubt.  2nd Circuit then reversed itself en banc, holding that gov’t need only prove its case with “reasonable, substantial, and probative evidence”
Holding: Facts must support deportability by clear, unequivocal, and convincing evidence.  Standard of proof discussed in §242(b)(4) is that of review of deportation decision, not standard for making decision in the first place.  Congress didn’t speak of the standard of proof because it is up to the judiciary to come up with it.  Petitioners argue that the standard should be the one in civil cases: preponderance of the evidence.  Court says that considering the serious consequences, standard should be higher.  In certain types of civil cases the standard is clear, unequivocal, convincing evidence and that should be used here as well.  Decision set aside and cases remanded for reconsideration.
Dissent: Court has no right to step the standard up.  This is Congress’ job and court is overstepping its bounds.  The APA limits the standard and the court can’t just substitute, which is what it is improperly doing here.

o	INS now must prove deportability by “clear and convincing evidence.”  INA § 240(c)(3)(A).  The word unequivocal has been dropped.  
o	INA § 291 creates an exception to the government’s burden of proof in deportability cases: a person against whom proceeding brought has the burden of proving “the time, place, and manner” of his or her entry into the US. 
•	If that burden is not sustained, person is (rebuttably) presumed to be in the US in violation of law and thus deportable under INA § 237(a)(1)(B)
•	Courts have assumed that the INS must establish “alienage” before the burden of proving time, place and manner of entry shifts to noncitizen

Refugee & Asylum
Overview
•	Refugees (“overseas refugees”)
o	INA § 101(a)(42) does not require that the person be outside the US; one of the statutory requirements for asylum under US law is that the person satisfy the statutory definition of “refugee”
•	Asylum-seekers
o	Every asylee is also a refugee
o	There is an ambiguity in the word “asylum”
o	Under US law, asylum actually refers only to one particular remedy for persecution: permission to remain at least temporarily, and usually permanently, in the US.  INA §§ 208, 209(b)
•	Asylum: relief available to persons under INA § 208 (permission to remain temporarily, and usually permanently)
•	Nonrefoulement: more limited form of relief—avoiding removal to the country of persecution but not necessarily to other countries
o	US statutory term for this limited form of relief is “withholding of removal”.  INA § 241(b)(3)
•	Refugee definition stems from UN Protocol and Convention relating to the Status of Refugees
o	US law added in Refugee Act of 1980
o	Prior thereto, defined as communist countries, Mid-eastern countries (Cold War ideology)
o	Formerly based on presidential decision to parole people in response to political crises
•	No overarching system; was reactive

Asylum: INA §§ 101(a)(42), 208, 209(b)	Withholding of Removal: INA § 241(b)(3)	
•	Permanent
•	Must show statutory eligibility; well-founded fear; see Acosta
•	Discretionary
•	Article 34: states will consider asylum for these people
•	US hanging on to discretionary power	•	Temporary
•	Clear probability; see Cardoza-Fonesca
•	Mandatory
•	Article 33 of international treaty; signatories cannot send these individuals back to home country
•	Not agreeing to give anything more
•	Making minimal agreement	

Procedure for Offshore Refugees
•	Consultation process
o	Organizations/agencies who work in the field bring info/data to gov’t; consult re: ceilings
o	Struggle to maintain balance of not basing numbers on political ties and foreign policy
•	Should be based on greatest humanitarian need
•	“Offshore” at camp in 3rd country
o	Must apply and meet definition and wait
o	Must fall into processing priority
1.	specifically identified
2.	specifically identified (still give preference to communist-fleeing persons)
3.	Three to five: relatives
o	Must have numbers available in quota
o	Matched with voluntary agency which arranges transport to US
•	In the US
o	Matched with other agencies
o	After one year, eligible to apply for LPR
o	After 5 years, eligible for USC
o	First 7-8 months, receive benefits
•	Groups lobbied for privately funded categories; pay independently for refugees
o	Typically highly-organized groups, i.e., Cubans and Jews
•	Priorities are geared more toward risk; no longer include US gov’t workers abroad and employees of US companies overseas

Asylum and Nonrefoulement
General
•	INA § 208: Asylum – permits person to remain in US at least temporarily and in most cases permanently
•	INA § 241(b)(3): Nonrefoulement/Withholding of Removal – prohibits forcible return to the country of persecution, but not to third countries
•	Two processes to apply:
o	Affirmatively apply to INS (Asylum office)
•	Application may be granted (then after 1 year, eligible for LPR) or may be “referred” to IJ for removal proceedings  then go to defensive stance
o	Defensively before Immigration Judge
•	If IJ denies, have one level of appeal to BIA; if denied, go to Circuit Court, then to Supreme Ct.

Persecution or Fear of Persecution
•	Refugee definition in INA § 101(a)(42) requires “persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution”
•	Motive for seeking asylum must be fear
•	Reasonable person in like circumstances would fear persecution 
o	Subjective: genuine fear
o	Objective: show reasonableness of fear through documentation and evidence
•	This is the attorney’s job
•	Look to what is happening to people similarly situated to the asylum-seeker
•	Actual harm or fear of persecution inflicted by the government or by a group that the government is unable or unwilling to control on account of the five factors.  Not harm arising out of civil strife or anarchy.  

o	Matter of Acosta (BIA 1985) pg 875
Facts: COTAXI (taxi cooperative that would result in purchase of taxis) mgr feared persecution because of threats, other taxi drivers had actually been filled, taxis seized and burned.  Respondent got specific notes – three threatening notes, anonymous notes.  Respondent was also beaten – thinks the men were guerrillas; also thinks government didn’t like COTAXI because thought it socialistic.  
Holding: Denied because did not meet definition of refugee.  Fear must be motivating factor for application for asylum.  His fear is based only on a subjective impression that government maybe thinks COTAXI took socialistic.  The country conditions have changed, too, so the fear is not well-founded.  Finally, must show that this is a country-wide threat to him and it is not in this case.  Thus, he does not meet asylum standard.

Acosta Test: 
(1)  Alien must have fear of persecution
(2)  Fear must be well-founded
(3)  Persecution feared must be “on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular   
       social group, or political opinion”
(4)  Alien must be unable or unwilling to return to his country of nationality or to the country in which he
       last habitually resided because of persecution or his well-founded fear of persecution

o	Matter of Mogharabbi (1987) supplement – Asylum vs. withholding, well-founded fear
Facts: Iranian man and wife were here as students and overstayed 2 years.  While in removal proceedings, man applied for asylum (wife included in his status), also applied for withholding of removal.
Holding:  Respondent demonstrated well-founded fear of persecution based on political beliefs and should get asylum.  In order to satisfy showing for withholding must show “life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in particular social group, or political opinion.”  Alien must establish a “clear probability” of persecution on account of one of the enumerated grounds, i.e. more likely than not that an alien will be subject to persecution.  Under Refugee Act, withholding mandatory when meet the standard and alien not ineligible under 243(h)(2).  This is different from asylum because asylum is discretionary.  To show ASYLUM must establish refugee under act, which means have “well-founded fear” of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group or political opinion.   In Cardoza-Fonseca, the Supreme Court said that these two standards are different; one for withholding is more difficult because it is mandatory.  The court held that the probable showing of persecution need not be made in order to establish a well-founded fear of persecution for asylum.  Each case will be assessed independently on the merits to see if standard met.  In Stevic, court offered guide for well-founded fear: “[S]o long as an objective situation is est. by the evidence; it need not be shown that the situation will probably result in persecution, but it is enough that persecution is a reasonable possibility.”  There is an obvious focus on the individual’s subjective beliefs.  Courts of Appeals have tried to define this term a little: “applicant must present specific facts establishing that s/he has actually been the victim of persecution or has some other good reason to fear that he or she will be singled out for persecution on account of” one of the 5 factors.  If we are relying solely on the applicant’s testimony then it must be credible, persuasive, and point to specific, objective facts.  What is critical is that the alien prove his fear is subjectively genuine and objectively reasonable.  BIA adopts the 5th circuit position that “an applicant for asylum has established a well-founded fear if he shows that a reasonable person in his circumstances would fear persecution.”  Not having corroborative evidence will not be fatal if alien testimony is as stated above.  Reaffirms the four elements to show “well-founded” as stated in Acosta.

Well-Founded Fear Test (Acosta and Mogharrabi) 
(1)  Individual possesses belief or characteristics that persecutor (gov’t/guerillas) seek to overcome by
       means of punishment of some sort
(2)  Gov’t/guerillas are aware or could “easily” (later omitted by Mogharabbi) become aware
(3)  Gov’t/guerillas have ability to punish the individual
(4)  Gov’t/guerillas have inclination to punish the individual

•	Persecution vs. Prosecution
o	Matter of Izatula (BIA 1990) pg 886
Facts: Applicant opposed Soviet army in Afghanistan; assisted the mujahedin.  Someone informed the secret police that he and his brother were assisting the rebels; agents came to his store and arrested brother and asked for the respondent; never saw or heard from his brother after the arrest; hid for 2 days; agent came to the house and beat up his father; uncle stated that secret police continued to look for him.  Fled to Pakistan and later the US.  IJ denied application for asylum because (1) no longer valid fear of being conscripted by the pro-Soviet Afghan army since Soviet forces have withdrawn and (2) fear was based on prosecution rather than persecution
Holding: Agree with IJ’s reasoning that applicant not eligible for asylum based on unwillingness to perform military service since Soviet forces have withdrawn.  However, do not agree that applicant would be subject to prosecution due to assistance to mujahedin.  Applicant demonstrated that he is at risk of imprisonment, at a minimum, in Afghanistan because of his political activity there.  Any punishment that the Afghan gov’t might impose on account of support for the mujahedin would not be an example of a legitimate and internationally recognized gov’t taking action to defend itself form an armed rebellion.  Applicant has established well-founded fear of persecution in Afghanistan.  
Concurring opinion: Just because it is not a democracy does not render gov’t illegitimate.

o	See Dwomoh v. Sava – “general rule [that} prosecution for an attempt to overthrow a lawfully constituted government does not constitute persecution…[is not] applicable in countries where a coup is the only means through which a change in the political regime can be effected.”

o	Arguing prosecution vs. persecution
•	Greatly disproportionate punishment for action/violation/offense; or
•	Showing that gov’t is not acting under democratic principles
•	Prosecution for an offense may, depending on the circumstances, be a pretext for punishing the offender for his political opinions or expression thereof
•	Such excessive or arbitrary punishment will amount to persecution.  UNHCR Handbook.

•	Coercive Population Controls as Persecution
o	INA § 101(a)(42): definition of refugee now contains provision for fear of persecution on account of political opinion for forced sterilization/abortion.  Now essentially a 6th ground for establishing persecution
•	IIRIRA § 601 amended statutory definition of refugee and superseded BIA decision in Matter of Chang
•	Any forced abortion or sterilization, or persecution for failure or refusal to submit to abortion or sterilization, constitutes persecution on account of political opinion.  
o	Applicant still needs favorable exercise of discretion; 1000 person cap per year
o	Major hurdle is demonstrating that the fear is well-founded
•	Burden on applicant to demonstrate that the State Department’s opinion (that forced sterilizations and abortions have become less frequent, that they occur mainly in rural areas, and they are especially unlikely to affect people while attending university in the US and then return home) is wrong or that she or he has particular reason to fear coerced sterilization or abortion.  

“On Account of Race, Religion, Nationality, Membership in a Particular Social Group, or Political Opinion”
•	Race, Religion, Nationality
o	Race and nationality asylum claims have been relatively infrequent
o	Religion has played an important role in the US overseas admission program, particularly with respect to Soviet Jews and Soviet evangelical Christians
•	Religion prong may prove useful in gender claims
•	Matter of S.A. (BIA 2000)(fundamentalist father abused daughter for failing to obey his religious dictates)
•	International Religious Freedom Act of 1998 creates a new Office on International Religious Freedom in the State Department, charged with monitoring religious persecution globally

•	Political Opinion
o	INS v. Elias-Zacharias (S. Ct. 1992) pg. 895 
Issue: Does guerilla coercion necessarily constitute persecution on account of political opinion?
Facts: Native of Guatemala applied for asylum and withholding, claiming well-founded fear of persecution based on political opinion.  One attempted recruitment by the guerilla and fear that gov’t would retaliate against him and his family if he did join guerillas.  Since departure, guerillas twice returned to family’s home trying to recruit him.  IJ denied application; BIA summarily dismissed; 9th Cir reversed, holding that acts of conscription by a nongovernmental group constitute persecution on account of political opinion and determined that applicant had a well-founded fear” of such conscription.
Holding: Mere existence of a generalized “political” motive underlying guerillas’ forced recruitment is inadequate to establish the claim that applicant fears persecution on account of political opinion.  Requires evidence so compelling that no reasonable fact-finder could fail to find the requisite fear of persecution.  
Dissent: Political opinion can be expressed negatively as well as affirmatively; refusal to support a cause can express a political opinion as effectively as an affirmative statement or affirmative conduct.

o	Elias-Zacharias Court frames the issue as whether a guerilla organization’s attempt to coerce a person into performing military service necessarily constitutes persecution on account of political opinion. 
•	Cases can be distinguished from Elias-Zacharias
•	But, major hurdle on appeal is the “no reasonable fact-finder” standard articulated by the Court

o	Look at motivation of persecutor government; with regard to guerillas, look at tactics of guerillas  if not with them, then against them

o	Imputed Political Opinion
•	As long as the persecutor believes the applicant holds a particular view and intends to persecute the person because of it, it does not matter that the belief is wrong.  
•	Even cynically imputed political opinion can suffice, such as when Salvadoran army sergeant had been holding a woman, repeatedly raping and beating her, and told her that if she left or told police he would label her as a subversive.  He knew she was not a subversive but because he was threatening to do that she had well founded fear of persecution on account of her political opinion.  Lazo-Majano v. INS

o	Cordero-Trejo v. INS (1st Cir. 1994) printout
Facts: Guatemalan citizen, upper-class, missionary.  Theory of case was well-founded fear of persecution on account of imputed political opinion (inciting revolts).  Clergy an religious laypersons labeled as subversive because dictatorship did not want people to become empowered, which is what the religious people were doing  threats to military dictatorship
Holding: So much evidence for applicant, goes to objective standard of fear; had family and successful life and gave it all up, goes to subjective fear.  

o	Neutrality as Political Opinion
•	Should neutrality be regarded as political opinion?
•	Bolanos-Hernandez v. INS (9th Cir. 1984): By choosing neutrality and refusing to join a particular political faction, applicant expressed his opinion and took a political stance.  That conduct is as much an affirmative expression of a political opinion as is joining a side, or speaking out for or against a side.  
•	Mendoza Perez v. INS (9th Cir. 1990): Without limits, recognizing neutrality as political opinion would allow a “politically inactive alien” to receive asylum.  It is a distortion of the meaning of an important requirement for refugee status when we permit political aloofness to serve as an active “political opinion” that endangers its holder.  This also demeans the true martyr for whom asylum was intended. 

•	“Particular Social Group”
o	General definition: Matter of Acosta
•	Must show persecution directed toward an individual who is a member of a group of persons all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic.  
•	Shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or kinship tied, or in some circumstances it might be a shared past experience such as former leadership or land ownership. 
•	Whatever the common characteristic that defines the group, must be one that the members of the group either cannot change or should not be required to change because it is fundamental to their individual identities or consciences.  
o	Family is a social group, as well. 
•	Family membership is an immutable characteristic

o	Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS (9th Cir. 1986) pg. 911
Facts: Young, urban, Salvadoran working class males alleging membership in “particular social group” for purposes of refugee status.  Forced recruitment from gov’t and guerillas. 
Holding: This type of all-encompassing grouping does not exemplify the type of “social group” protected under INA; not cohesive, homogeneous group for which the term was intended to apply.  
•	This was a test case; these types of cases are now argued as imputed political opinion (Zacharias)
•	In these circumstances, again, issue of persecution vs. prosecution comes up

o	Ninth Circuit interpreted Sanchez-Trujillo as an alternative to the Acosta test,  holding that “particular social group” is one united by a voluntary association, including a former association, or by an innate characteristic that is so fundamental to the identities or consciences of its members that members either cannot or should not be required to change it.  

DOJ Proposed Rule – 8 CFR § 208.15(C)(1)	
Membership in a particular social group
•	Factors that may be considered in addition to the required factors set forth in this section, but are not necessarily determinative, in deciding whether a particular social group exists include whether: 
(Sanchez-Trujillo)
(1) members of the group are closely affiliated
(2) members are driven by a common motive or interest
(3) voluntary associational relationship exists among the members
(In re R.A.)
(4) group is recognized to be a societal faction or is otherwise a recognized segment of the population of the country in question
(5) members view themselves as members of the group
(6) society in which the group exists distinguishes members of the group for different treatment or status than is accorded to other members of the society	

•	Sexual Orientation and Social Group
o	Matter of Toboso-Alfonso (BIA 1990) pg 921
Facts: Cuban homosexual male who had been persecuted in Cuba and would be persecuted again if he returned; IJ denied asylum in the exercise of discretion because of cocaine possession conviction, but granted withholding.  INS appealed.  
Holding: Upheld IJ’s grant of withholding; status of being homosexual was basis of persecution, as distinguished from engaging in homosexual acts (which would be prosecution).  Homosexuality is a particular social group because it is an immutable characteristic.  Uses both Acosta (immutable characteristic) and Sanchez-Trujillo (voluntary association).  

•	Gender and Social Group
o	Fatin v. INS (3rd Cir. 1993) pg. 930
Facts: Iranian woman seeking asylum for fear of returning to home country because of fundamentalist government.  IJ denied petitioners application because no indication that gov’t would single her out and persecute her.  In brief to BIA, argued fear of persecution on account of particular social group and political opinion; identified social group of upper class Iranian women who supported the Shah, a group of educated Westernized free-thinking individuals.  BIA dismissed appeal, no evidence that she would be singled out, but rather subject to same restrictions and requirements as rest of population.
Holding: The particular social group identified by petitioner may satisfy the BIA’s definition because if a woman’s opposition to the Iranian laws is so profound that she would choose to suffer the severe consequences of noncompliance, her beliefs may well be characterized as “so fundamental to her identity or conscience that they ought not to be required to be changed.  However, the record failed to establish that she is a member of this defined group; there is no evidence that she so oppose the Iranian gov’t that she would refuse to comply with the law.  Thus, record does not show that the consequences that would befall her as a member of the group would constitute persecution.  
•	Three potential groups cited
•	All women (Acosta)
•	Did not show that she would suffer persecution solely on her gender
•	Is this required?  
•	Women who object but conform
•	Persecution not found
•	Should an individual be forced to risk severe penalties before a court will recognize that convictions are fundamental to personal identity?
•	Women who refuse to conform, despite the severe penalties
•	Court acknowledges that such women might well meet the statutory definition

o	Matter of Kasinga
Facts: Female native of Togo feared FGM. 
Holding: Persecution on account of status a member of particular social group (young women who have not had FGM, as practiced by her tribe, and who oppose the practice).  Met burden of well-founded fear because a reasonable person in her circumstances would fear persecution upon return to Togo.  Rises to the level of persecution because does not require subjective punitive or malignant intent.  

“Well-Founded” Fear and “Would be Threatened”: The Standards of Proof
•	For asylum under INA § 208, must establish “refugee status requiring fear of persecution on account of one of the five protected grounds
o	Fear must be well-founded
o	If a reasonable person in the applicant’s circumstances would fear persecution.  Mogharabbi.
•	Well founded fear is made out when an applicant, “on the basis of objective circumstances personally known to him, believes that he has at least a one in ten chance of being killed by the guerillas.  Montecino v. INS (9th Cir. 1990), Martirosyan v. INS (9th Cir. 2000)
•	For withholding under INA § 241(b)(3), must establish that applicant’s life or freedom “would be threatened” 
o	“Clear probability” that life would be threatened on account of one of the five statutory grounds; clear probability means “more likely than not.” INS v. Stevic (S. Ct. 1984)

Methods of Proof
•	Material Facts
o	Membership in a Persecuted Group
•	Under Acosta, persecution implies a singling out of the particular individual
•	Permissible for applicant to establish well-founded fear of persecution by showing a pattern or practice of the country persecution a group of people and the applicant’s inclusion in that group, but adds qualifier “such that the applicant’s fear of persecution upon return is reasonable.”  8 CFR § 208.13(b)(2)(i) (2000)
o	Past Persecution
•	Evidence of past persecution can help applicant establish well-founded fear of future persecution
•	Refugee definition in INA § 101(a)(42) makes past persecution an independent basis for refugee status, i.e., even when there is no threat of future persecution. 
•	Following Matter of Chen (BIA 1989), DOJ regulations provide a rebuttable presumption that one who has suffered past persecution has a well-founded fear of future persecution
•	In 2000, DOJ amended regulations to permit the INS to rebut the presumption either by
•	Showing any fundamental change in circumstances that eliminates the required well-founded fear on one of the protected grounds (change in personal circumstances as well as country conditions
•	Showing that the applicant could avoid future persecution by relocating to another part of applicant’s country and under all the circumstances it would be reasonable to expect the applicant to do so.  
•	If a person is found to be a refugee solely on basis of past persecution, asylum must be denied unless the person has demonstrated either
•	Compelling reasons for being unable or unwilling to return; or 
•	A reasonable possibility that he or she may suffer other serious harm upon removal to that country

•	Relevant Evidence
o	Applicant’s Own Testimony
•	Courts and BIA recognize that authentic refugees are rarely able to offer direct corroboration of specific threats or specific incidents of persecution.  Mogharabbi.
•	Issues of credibility and whether the credible testimony alone will establish eligibility for asylum
•	BIA increasingly inclined to allow IJs to deny asylum claims on grounds of lack of corroborating evidence
•	BIA steadily increased deference to adverse credibility determinations by IJs

•	Damaize-Job v. INS (9th Cir. 1986) pg. 982
Facts: Applicant from Nicaragua; accused him of being a guardsman in opposition forces, which he was not; also a Miskito Indian, a group persecuted by Sandinistas.  Argued persecution on account of nationality, imputed political opinion, social group, and race.  IJ denied asylum because no reason that he would be singled out (no longer necessary!); BIA stated no well-founded fear because applicant returned to Nicaragua when uncle and sister were missing and was not persecuted and got passport from gov’t.  Adverse credibility determination based on not having applied for asylum in other countries en route; dates inconsistent; failure to marry mother of his child.
Holding: BIA improperly concluded that Damaize did not demonstrate a clear probability of persecution because this finding is not supported by substantial evidence.  Mere possession of a valid passport is not a bar to refugee status since possession cannot always be considered as evidence of loyalty on the part of the holder or of the absence of fear.  Sandinistas treatment of Miskitos characterized as “genocide.” Ability to remain unharmed in Nicaragua during stay not fatal to his case.  None of the adverse credibility determinations by IJ are valid grounds to base a finding that an asylum applicant is not credible.  

Certain Bars to Asylum and Withholding	
•	Firm resettlement
•	Felony conviction
•	Security threat
•	Persecution of others	

Exceptions to Eligibility
•	Firm Resettlement – 8 CFR § 208.15 (2001)
o	A person will be considered firmly resettled in another country if, before arriving in the US, the person received an offer to resettle permanently in that country.  
o	Firm resettlement will not be found if the person’s entry into the third country was a “necessary consequence of his flight from persecution,” he or she “remained in that country only as long as was necessary to arrange onward travel,” and “significant ties” were not established.  
o	As a result of IIRIRA § 604(a), INS permitted to remove asylum applicant even to third countries in which they are not firmly resettled.  Must be a bilateral or multilateral agreement, and certain minimum safeguards must be present.  INA § 208(a)(2).

•	Past Wrongdoing
o	Claimants who have participated in the persecution of others on account of race, religion, etc. are statutorily ineligible for both asylum and withholding.  INA §§ 208(b)(2)(A)(i to v), 208(b)(2)(B)(i), and 241(b)(3)(B)
o	Asylum and withholding are also unavailable when AG finds reasonable grounds for believing the person is “a danger to the security of the US.”  INA §§ 208(b)(2)(A)(ii, iii), 241(b)(3)(B)(ii, iii)

o	Matter of Carballe (BIA 1986) pg. 996
Facts: Cuban was paroled into US and then convicted of armed robbery and theft.  Claimed would be singled out in Cuba for committing these crimes.  Argued that factual findings required by §243(m)(2)(B) mean IJ must determine that applicant has been convicted of particularly serious crime and THEN determine if person presents danger to the community.  [this argument has been accepted before but mostly rejected.]  
Holding: BIA says particularly serious crime is not defined in the statute; the key is: does the crime indicate that the alien poses a danger to the community?  The focus is on the crime committed.  BIA says robbery is inherently “particularly serious.”  Of convicted of a particularly serious crime, presumptively a danger to society.  Once someone is found ineligible due to bar, there is no need to look to merits of the case because there is no discretion.  If someone can overcome a bar then IJ will look to merits.  

Discretion in Asylum Cases
•	Matter of Pula (BIA 1987) pg. 1005
Facts: Applicant came to US with false document.
Holding: Prior decisions placed too much emphasis on the circumvention of orderly refugee procedures; this is only one of a number of factors which should be balanced in exercising discretion, and the weight accorded to such factor may vary depending on eh facts of a particular case
o	Totality of the circumstances and actions of an alien in flight from country where he fears persecution
•	whether alien passed through any country
•	were orderly procedures in fact available
•	any attempts made to seek asylum in other countries
•	length of time alien remained in third country
•	living conditions, safety, and potential for long-term residency
•	legal relatives in US
•	other personal ties to US
•	how serious was fraud used to circumvent?
•	general humanitarian concerns: tender age or poor health

o	Fraudulent passport could raise identity problem: who are you really?  Credibility issue, too. 

Procedure
•	Certain features of the present adjudication process have been subjects of debate
o	Political bias
•	Past statistics support historical accusations of political bias
•	Class action by Salvadoran and Guatemalan asylum claimants against the INS, EOIR, and the State Department, alleging pattern and practice of widespread discrimination against nationals of these countries in the adjudication of asylum claims.  ABC case.  
•	Near elimination of anti-Communist bias in asylum cases, except for Cuba
o	Long delays
•	Most serious overload occurs at administrative level
•	Prolong uncertainty for genuine refugees
•	Very act of applying for asylum can bring concrete interim benefits
•	Permission to work, but 1994 regulations have restricted employment authorization rules

o	Unfounded claims
•	Two incentives to file an unfounded asylum claim: (1) hope that claim will be erroneously granted; (2) certain interim benefits usually attach while claim is pending
o	Fiscal costs
o	Procedural fairness
•	Difficulty in assuring that noncitizens know or learn of their statutory rights to apply for asylum
•	Access to counsel
•	Elements of the hearing process (adequacy of interpreters)

Beyond Persecution: Protection against other Dangers
Convention Against Torture
•	First worldwide convention targeted specifically at torture and related cruelties

Temporary Protected Status
•	AG “may” grant TPS to an eligible national of a designated country.  INA § 244(a)1)(A)
•	Exclusive authority of AG to allow parolees or deportable noncitizens to remain in the US temporarily on the basis of country or region.  INA § 244(g)
•	Can be given for reasons other than five protected reasons
o	Natural disasters

POLICY AND LEGISLATIVE CHANGES IN RESPONSE TO SEPTEMBER 11th

USA PATRIOT Act
•	Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001
o	Expansion of power to intercept communications
o	Expansion of category of people banned from country and those to be removed; “suspicion”
o	Expansion of lists of terrorist organizations [US designates the groups and countries that are considered terrorist]
o	Removal of attorney-client privilege for many situations
•	Detention
o	AG has said that he will not release info about who has been detained where, etc. under FOIA.
o	Detainee must be certified with some grounds for suspicion
o	Must charge within 7 days or release; cannot be detained indefinitely
•	Deportation
o	Material support to any government/terrorist organization designated by State Department
o	Per se deportable offense; deemed on notice
•	Burden shifts to alien that any material support given is not in furtherance of terrorist organization

•	Military Tribunals
o	Bush, as Commander-In-Chief of Armed Forces, issued a military order that if there is reason to believe a person is involved in terrorist activity, then that person can be tried in military tribunal
o	Maximum penalty is death
o	Military officials sit on the panel to decide cases by a 2/3 vote
o	Appellate rights: to President, who can designate to Secretary of Defense or AG to decide
o	Standard: is there probative evidence to support the allegation?  (This is less than civil standard)
o	This applies to non-citizens only

Border Security Bill
•	How to increase security outside border; four layers of security.  Info sharing among branches of gov’t 

Homeland Security Bill
•	Suggests that immigration is a matter of national security
•	Has not yet been passed; broke down on other grounds

Proposed bills to further restrict immigration
•	SAFER Act: cut immigration by 25% and call it safer
•	Gephardt Bill: generous legalization bill; it is in our economic interest to legalize; give legal status to those who have earned it

Executive Branch Response
•	Even before PATRIOT Act, DOJ and Executive branch gave itself huge power; does not have to certify, as specified by PATRIOT Act.

Courts’ Response Mixed
•	Secrecy of hearings and names
•	Conditions of detention
•	Specific challenge to regulation streamlining the BIA and reducing to 11 members

Exam

Nonimmigrants
Employment-based immigration
Family immigration
•	Marriage and other family relationships
Grounds for inadmissibility
•	Waivers
Asylum
•	Theory of the case – Argue as many grounds that might apply!
•	How to argue well-founded fear
o	Citing cases
•	Recognizing grounds for mandatory bars